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RECOVERING RYLANDS: AN ESSAY
FOR ROBERT RABIN
Gregory C. Keating*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Robert Rabin's discussion of Rylands v. Fletcher appears
as something of an aside in a lovely and influential article on the rise
of fault liability. That article-The Historical Development of the
Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation'-is one among a number of influ-
ential, widely admired papers that Rabin has written on central topics
in the law of torts.2 This Festschrift has provided the pleasurable op-
portunity to revisit several of these papers and to discover that they
are even richer and more instructive than I remembered. We-or at
least I-remember important papers by recalling their fundamental
claims and insights. There is much to be said for this form of mental
indexing, but one of its costs is forgetting the enormous richness of
genuinely distinguished papers. The best papers resist reduction even
to their general lessons. When we return to them, they are always
fresh and reward rereading. It is a mark of the distinction of Rabin's
career that he has given us more than a few papers that have this
eternal freshness. We are all in his debt, both for the learning and the
pleasure.
The Fault Principle itself was slotted into my memory for persua-
sively advancing a large and important claim about the emergence of
modem negligence law in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
The then-prevailing scholarly wisdom summarized this age of tort law
* William T. Dalessi Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Southern California
Gould School of Law. I am grateful to Catherine Sharkey, Robert Rabin, and the participants in
the 17th Annual Clifford Symposium for illuminating comments and discussion. I am also grate-
ful to Judy Choi, Nicole Creamer, and Kevin Crow for research assistance.
1. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15
GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) [hereinafter Rabin, The Fault Principle].
2. Themes in The Fault Principle play out in a number of Rabin's classic articles. A partial list
of these articles includes Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999) [here-
inafter Rabin, Enabling Torts]; Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss
Rule in Tort, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 857 (2006); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of
Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190 (1996) [hereinafter Rabin, Some Thoughts]; Robert L.
Rabin, The Fault of Not Knowing: A Comment, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 427 (2003); and
Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).
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with phrases like the "emergence of universal fault liability" or the
"rise of general fault liability." Usually, some incarnation of Oliver
Wendell Holmes comes to mind. Fault, we were taught, emerged in
the latter half of the nineteenth century out of, and in dialectical op-
position to, strict liability. The Fault Principle teaches that we seri-
ously misunderstand this moment, and the historical process working
itself out, unless we set the transformation of tort law's internal logic
in the larger context of the landscape of liability for unintentional
harm. And when we take that broader view, we see that nonliabilty-
not strict liability-was the dominant feature of the legal landscape of
the time. "[F]ault liability emerged out of a world-view dominated
largely by no-liability thinking."3 This makes a difference: if fault lia-
bility overthrew strict liability, it represents a contraction of civil lia-
bility; if it emerged out of a world of no liability, it represents an
expansion.
The fault principle, Rabin shows, is hedged in by three insufficiently
appreciated limits. First, the fault principle-and tort law more gener-
ally-yields to property law when the liability of landowners is at is-
sue.4 The ancient status categories of property law determined the
obligations that landowners owed to entrants of their property and
"[o]nly in the case of an 'invitee' did the courts regard landowners as
owing a duty of due care."5 Second, tort yields to contract in both the
workplace and product contexts.6 Third, even when the fault principle
holds sway over liability for unintended harm, it is hemmed in by large
domains of damnum absque injuria.7 Liability for economic or emo-
tional harm, no matter how severe, was not yet even in its infancy.
The realm of the fault principle is a relatively small patch in the
legal landscape; namely, accidents among strangers arising out of the
activities distinctive to an industrializing society.8 Fault is not over-
throwing a prior regime of strict liability; it is the answer to questions
of first impression. From the point of view of the cases, there is no
preexisting doctrine to overthrow. 9 Because both property and con-
tract trump tort and because both emotional and economic harm go
unrecognized, "no liability" (or "no duty") is far more common than
fault liability. "The fault theory maintains its pervasive character by
largely ignoring the fact that a variety of prima facie negligent activi-
3. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 928.
4. Id. at 933-36.
5. Id. at 933.
6. Id. at 936-42, 946-47.
7. Id. at 948-52.
8. See id. at 947.
9. See Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 937.
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ties systematically were treated as outside the ambit of negligence
law."' 0 All of this lends itself to a certain sort of easy summary: the
article is indexed in my memory under "no duty." I want to thank
Rabin for that. Not every article can be epitomized so pithily.
My memory was not faulty. The Fault Principle does make the ar-
gument that I just summarized. The argument, moreover, is funda-
mentally sound and well worth remembering. The Fault Principle
teaches us something essential about the character and structure of
modern tort law at the time of its genesis, and it reminds us of the
even more general truth that what the law does not cover is at least as
important as what it does cover.
But my memory did not do justice to the richness or the sophistica-
tion of the piece either. For one thing, the article is constructed
around a simple but powerful distinction between fault (or negli-
gence) as breach of duty and fault (or negligence) as a cause of action.
That felicitous distinction enables Rabin to explain the error of tradi-
tional tort history in this tidy way: fault emerges as the cornerstone of
liability for unintended harm in tort, but the negligence cause of ac-
tion does not emerge as the dominant legal regime governing unin-
tended harm." Duty determinations are prior to, and more important
than, breach determinations,12 and when we inquire into determina-
tions of duty, we see that property, contract, and damnum absque in-
juria dominate fault-based liability. The simplicity and elegance of
this thesis are as appealing as its accuracy.
For another, the article is a powerful critique of the still-influential
argument that negligence, in its formative era, was economically effi-
cient.13 Here, Rabin is sensitive to doctrine, to contemporaneous per-
ceptions of the nature and basis of tort liability, and to the limitations
on what formal doctrine and case law can teach us. Starting with neg-
ligence liability itself, Rabin challenges William Landes and Richard
Posner's claim that Holmes's account of negligence prefigures the
modern economic conception. 14 That challenge begins by pointing
10. Id. at 949.
11. See id. at 933-54.
12. See id. at 932 ("The great failure of tort historians has been the tendency to ignore [the]
fundamental distinction [between negligence as breach of duty and negligence as cause of ac-
tion].... The fault principle is thus robbed of any sensible meaning, because key elements in a
negligence case having nothing to do with breach of due care-particularly, the duty question-
frequently are determinative of major categories of injury claims." (footnotes omitted)).
13. This thesis is identified preeminently with the early work of Richard Posner, and Rabin's
work criticizes the thesis as Posner develops it, both individually and in conjunction with William
Landes.
14. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 929-32.
2012] 545
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
out that Holmes's argument for negligence liability and against strict
liability is based on a "policy" of preferring freedom of action.
Holmes's argument does not prefigure the economic case for negli-
gence both because it is based on freedom, not efficiency, and be-
cause-as an abstract matter-negligence is not superior to strict
liability when it comes to inducing efficient precaution.15
At its most general, the choice between negligence and strict liabil-
ity "only goes to the initial allocation of injury costs" and not to "the
total resource activity."1 6 Strict liability and negligence differ with re-
spect to who bears the cost of accidental harm that should not be pre-
vented. Negligence leaves those harms on the victims who happen to
suffer them, whereas strict liability shifts them back to the injurers
who inflict them. But economically rational actors take the same pre-
cautions under either regime. Under negligence, they take cost-
justified precautions in order to avoid liability. Under strict liability,
they take only cost-justified precautions and no more because it is
cheaper to pay for accidents that cost-justified precautions would not
have prevented than it is to avoid those accidents by taking more than
cost-justified precaution. Holmes's case for negligence liability, more-
over, is a moral case, rooted in individual freedom. The economic
case denies that fault liability finds its justification in morality, except
insofar as we are morally averse to squandering resources. The link
between Holmes's moral argument and Landes and Posner's eco-
nomic argument is therefore asserted but not shown.
The gap between Holmes's thought and economic theory persists
when we move from the case for negligence liability to the character
of negligent conduct. Rabin reminds us that negligence law in its
formative period did not identify fault with economic inefficiency.17
The "due care standard" was tied "to community expectations of rea-
sonable behavior, rather than to the economist's perception of rational
behavior." 8 Rationality is a matter of prudence, whereas reasonable-
ness is a matter of morality. Rational behavior pursues one's own in-
terests intelligently, whereas reasonable behavior takes due account of
the interests of other people. In practice, tort law's commitment to
reasonableness, not rationality, meant "holding the actor responsible
to the standards of expected behavior in the community," and in the-
15. Id. at 929-31 & n.15.
16. Id. at 929 n.15.
17. Perhaps I should confess that this point is independently important to me. See generally
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311
(1996).
18. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 931.
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ory, it "suggest[ed] a moral basis for the fault principle." 19 Evidence
that fault liability implicitly and intuitively embodied economic effi-
ciency hangs mostly by the slender thread of the later-articulated
Learned Hand Formula.
Next, Rabin points out that Posner's identification of economic effi-
ciency with fault liability undermines his larger claim for the efficiency
of the common law because "no duty" dominates "duty" in the larger
structure of late nineteenth-century law. The categorical exclusion of
fault considerations from both product and industrial accidents pre-
cludes the tailoring of precaution to cost. The sparse historical evi-
dence that we have, moreover, suggests that these exclusions were not
based in efficiency considerations. Courts embraced privity of con-
tract in the product accident context primarily out of a wholesale fear
of unbounded liability. 20 In the workplace-accident context, assump-
tion of risk and the fellow-servant rule were perceived to run counter
to the wishes and economic interests of workers, and the precondi-
tions for efficient market allocation of risk appear to have been
absent. 21
In short, tort liability-fault liability-retreats whenever contract is
capable of taking hold of a domain of accidental injury. It retreats
both in the presence of contractual relations in the workplace context
and in the absence of contractual relations in the product context.
The trigger is not what contract does but what contract is in a position
to do. In the workplace context, contract is in a position to govern the
legal relations between employers and employees. In the product
context, the only relations susceptible to contractual governance-and
the only relations that are therefore candidates for legal duties-are
the relations between sellers and buyers. Furthermore, just as tort is
trumped by contract, so too it is trumped by property. In the case of
landowner liability, tort yields to the status categories of real property
law. These categorical limitations on fault liability foreclose the calcu-
lation of cost and benefit by fault liability. That is no small problem
for a theory that identifies economic efficiency with the operation of
fault liability.
Last, The Fault Principle makes brilliant use of the well-taken Real-
ist point that decisions are written to justify conclusions and predicate
19. Id. at 930. See generally Keating, supra note 17 (offering an account of the negligence
principle based on reasonableness as a moral norm).
20. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 936-37 (quoting 10 M.&W. 109,152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842)).
21. Id. at 939-43. In particular, the autonomy and mobility to effect trade offs between safety
and wages appear to have been absent, and what little evidence there is casts doubt on the
existence of a wage premium for unusually hazardous work.
2012] 547
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
their arguments on the facts as the decision narrates those facts.22 The
result is that judicial rhetoric alone cannot settle the question of
whether it was, or was not, efficient to prevent an accident. Judicial
opinions may well show that it was inefficient to prevent the accident
as described by the court, but that is not the same as showing that it
was actually inefficient to prevent the accident. Adams v. Bullock is
one of Rabin's well-chosen cases in point.23 Landes and Posner assert
that Adams made "as clear a statement as one might ask of the pro-
position that the optimal level of care is a function of its cost." 2 4 This
claim, however, "depends on the circularity of taking the court's story
of the case at face value" and ignores "the trivial cost of a warning
sign at the overpass." 25 Showing the efficiency of common law legal
decisions requires critically examining their facts, not accepting what
courts have to say about the facts in the course of concluding that they
do not support a finding of fault. This cautionary reminder of the
complexities involved in finding fault is, moreover, as timely today as
it was in 1981, when The Fault Principle was first published.
Taken together, Rabin's observations constitute a tour de force cri-
tique of the thesis that the common law of negligence circa 1870
through 1905 was economically efficient. The Fault Principle's larger
point that duty and "no duty" are anterior to breach and determine
the size of the domain that the fault principle governs is a lesson that
every tort scholar should absorb. Negligence as breach of duty must
indeed be distinguished from negligence as cause of action if we are to
avoid conflating the law's character with its scope. Put differently,
negligence as a cause of action is an institution-an organized system
22. See id. at 954-55.
23. See id. at 955 (citing Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919)). Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), and In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964),
are two other cases discussed. See id. at 957.
24. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15
GA. L. REV. 851, 894 (1981). Rabin also discusses Adams in The Fault Principle. Rabin, The
Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 955 ("Judge Cardozo asserted that plaintiff, who was electro-
cuted when a long wire he was carrying touched the defendant's uninsulated trolley line beneath
an overpass, had failed to demonstrate negligence-because the injury was highly unlikely and
the defendant would have been put to considerable expense abandoning the overhead system of
electricity."). Put slightly differently, Judge Cardozo's point is that generalizing the precaution
that he assumed was necessary to prevent this injury (no overhead electrification of trolleys) is
unacceptably high, an unacceptable general practice. Plaintiff's case for negligence therefore
fails. But if sparing use of well-placed warnings would prevent the accident, the matter would be
entirely different. Plaintiff's failure is a failure to articulate the correct untaken precaution, the
precaution that would have been worth taking.
25. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 955.
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of norms, concepts, and roles.26 To understand negligence law, large
legal norms such as duty, breach, cause in fact, and proximate cause
and large concepts such as risk, reasonableness, and harm must be
understood in relation to one another. And we must also understand
the distinction between law and fact, the nature of mixed questions of
law and fact, and the relation of these to the respective roles of judge
and jury and attend to negligence law's famous affinity for standards
over rules.
When we think about the pervasiveness of negligence law-that is,
about whether some asserted historical moment lies within an era
when fault liability predominates or not-we must place the scope of
the institution's application front and center. When we think of negli-
gence as an institution, even at the close of the historical period that is
supposed to have been the heyday of fault liability, the era of univer-
sal fault liability had yet to come.27 In 1905, the extension of fault
liability to product accidents was still more than a decade away; the
extension of fault liability to landowner liability was more than a half
century away; and the expansion of liability for emotional and eco-
nomic injury had barely begun. In 1905, contract still controlled prod-
uct accidents; property categories still controlled landowner liability;
and "no duty" was-the near-universal norm with respect to emotional
and economic injury. At the turn of the twentieth century, the era of
"universal fault liability" was a future prospect, not a present
achievement. 28
26. The idea of an institution is, I think, intuitive and is implicitly invoked in an intuitive sense
by Rabin when he distinguishes between negligence as a cause of action and negligence as a
breach of a duty of care. Negligence as a cause of action implies an institution. The intuitive
idea of an institution was, however, developed by enduringly famous philosophical writings in
the 1950s and early 1960s. These writings bear on the point in the text because they help to
clarify why it is important to understand a legal regime as an organized normative whole, even if
it is far from perfectly coherent. The preeminent writings are John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955), and H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Rawls distin-
guishes between rules of thumb (or "summary" rules) and "practice" (or "constitutive" rules).
The latter enables people to do things that they would not otherwise be able to do; games are a
canonical case in point. Hart explicates the character of law by developing the idea of a "social
rule" and arguing that this idea is at the center of law. Negligence is an institution in the sense
that it is an integrated system of concepts and norms. Those concepts and norms as a whole
determine the care that persons owe to one another with respect to a large domain of accidental
harms.
27. Rabin suggests that the traditional view takes fault liability to come of age circa 1870 and
to begin to wane circa 1905. These are very rough dates.
28. See, e.g., Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 934.
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II. STRICT LIABILITY IN THE WORLD OF No LIABILITY
Where, then, does Rylands fit in all of this? In the broad sweep of
Rabin's narrative, Rylands is cast to the margin. There is no contest
between fault and strict liability. The contest is between fault liability
and no liability. In the more tailored telling of the story, Rylands fits
in as the flip side of the "no duty" status categories:
In focusing on the common law classifications of entrants, one finds
a categorical impulse to deny or limit liability. But where the land-
owner is victim rather than culprit, the rationale for limited liabil-
ity-the primacy of land occupancy-is sufficiently powerful to
embrace the counter-principle of strict liability as well.
In this regard, many of the early land-related categories of strict
liability can be viewed as "reverse no-liability" situations. If land-
owners owed virtually no duty of care to entrants on their land, con-
versely those who in fact entered without permission and proceeded
to cause physical damage, or interfered in some substantial way with
the owner's unfettered enjoyment of his homestead, owed an abso-
lute obligation to compensate for harm done. On this basis, a clus-
ter of disparate cases, apparent anomalies in the fault era-wild
animal, blasting and nuisance actions, for instance, as well as the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher-share a common heritage. To put it
simply, virtually unlimited enjoyment of one's own land was a two-
sided coin, at once supporting a conditional freedom to maintain
land as one wished, and, at the same time, promoting a conditional
freedom affirmatively to enjoy one's land without interference. 29
Speaking loosely, strict liability is the flip side of the coin of "no duty,"
just as contributory fault is the flip side of fault. Speaking strictly,
Rabin is not making a claim about the rights and responsibilities of
potential injurers and potential victims with a particular liability re-
gime-a claim, say, that assumption of risk is the natural complement
to strict liability in the Restatement (Second) of Torts regime for ab-
normally dangerous activities because assumption of risk is victim
strict liability. Rabin is claiming a larger and looser kind of coher-
ence. Real property conferred something quite close to Blackstone's
"sole and despotic dominion" over a domain.30 That dominion justi-
fied both limiting the obligations of persons in control of real property
to entrants into that domain (because such responsibilities would di-
minish dominion) and holding people whose acts or activities did in-
trude into that domain strictly responsible for the harms they inflicted
(so that harms flowing from the exercise of their agency did not impair
that dominion).
29. Id. at 935-36 (footnotes omitted).
30. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766).
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A. Generalizing Strict Liability
My aim in this Article is not to challenge either this particular claim
or the larger idea that fault liability emerged against a background in
which no duty dominated the landscape of liability for accidental in-
jury. Rather, my aim is to make a point parallel to one that scholars
have made in the context of negligence liability. Even though negli-
gence liability was not universal in the late nineteenth century, negli-
gence liability itself emerged as a freestanding form of liability in
tort.31 That emergence set the stage for the expansion of fault liability
into the domains of product accidents, landowner liability, and pure
economic and emotional harm. What happened in the latter part of
the nineteenth century made widespread fault liability a possibility,
not an actuality. To oversimplify, negligence was reconstructed from a
subjective state of mind (inadvertence) necessary to commit various
nominate torts into an objective norm of conduct (the care that a rea-
sonable person would exercise in the circumstances). This reconstruc-
tion turned negligence into a general principle of responsibility for
harm done, a principle around which a freestanding theory of liability
for accidental harm could be constructed. The internal transformation
of tort in the late nineteenth century put the principle that people
should exercise the care appropriate in the circumstances to prevent
reasonably foreseeable physical injury to others both on the map and
at the conceptual center of tort. To be sure, tort's external relations
underwent relatively little change. The law of tort as a whole re-
mained hemmed in by property, contract, and "no duty" even as tort's
internal affairs were radically reorganized. This internal reconstruc-
tion, however, was the necessary precondition for the later transfor-
mation of tort's external relations, a transformation effectuated by the
projection of tort into the domains of product accidents and land-
owner liability.
Rylands represents the parallel development with respect to strict
liability. It abstracts a general idea of strict liability from the particu-
lars of liability for nuisance and trespass. That idea might be summa-
rized as the idea of activity liability. People ought to be held
responsible for harms properly attributable to their acts and activities
31. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1256-57, 1266-68 (2001)
(explaining how Oliver Wendell Holmes's innovations helped negligence emerge during the late
nineteenth century as an independent tort organized around a general duty of reasonable care).
Oliver Wendell Holmes's proclamation that tort law imposes a duty "of all the world to all the
world" is at the intellectual center of this emergence of negligence as an independent tort. The
Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660 (1873) (unsigned article universally attributed to Oliver
Wendell Holmes); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 12-13, 343 n.63 (Ex-
panded ed. 2003) (attributing The Theory of Torts to Holmes).
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even if they conduct themselves carefully. To inflict serious injury on
another is to do something that, by itself, creates some obligation of
repair toward the person harmed. When (1) an actor inflicts harm in
the course of pursuing their private benefit and (2) the actor expects
to reap the rewards of the risks from which that harm resulted, then
(3) it is only fair that the actor take the bitter with the sweet and bear
responsibility for the harm that it does to others in the course of pur-
suing its own advantage. Rylands articulates, incarnates, and illus-
trates this strict idea of responsibility.
The orthodox view of late nineteenth-century tort law is thus essen-
tially correct in one respect. Fault did blossom within tort as a free-
standing principle of liability, around which the law of tort would
center going forward.32 And as fault blossomed into a general princi-
ple of liability for harm inadvertently done, Rylands generalized the
counterprinciple of strict liability as a full-blown principle of responsi-
bility in its own right. Just as the fault revolution itself did not mark
the triumph of general fault liability, so too Rylands did not mark the
rise of general strict liability. But what it did was put strict liability on
the table as a general alternative to negligence liability.3 3 Without Ry-
lands, strict liability is a set of isolated instances; no general concep-
tion of responsibility ties them together. On facts that powerfully
support its inclinations, Rylands states strict liability as an intuitively
powerful and, in principle, general conception of responsibility for
harm done. Or so I shall argue.
This seems worth arguing not so much "even at this late date" as
"especially now." Fault liability ebbs and flows in the extent of its
coverage, but the existence of a "negligence cause of action" and its
standing as the default regime for accidental physical harm is widely
accepted today. Strict liability is far more embattled. A generation
ago, enterprise liability was thought to be swallowing whole the law of
torts, and tort was thought to be swallowing contract and property. 34
32. See Grey, supra note 31, at 1262-63 & nn.108-15.
33. In this respect, I believe that I am in general agreement with Kenneth Abraham's view.
See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law's Conscience, in TORTS STO-
RIES 207 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
34. See WHTTE, supra note 31; see also George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461
(1985). For an alternative account of the rise of enterprise liability, see Gregory C. Keating, The
Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285 (2001).
By "enterprise liability" I mean to identify a form of tort liability constructed around two prem-
ises: (1) that enterprises or activities should be held responsible for the harms that are character-
istic of their activities and (2) that enterprises or activities should disperse the financial costs of
those harms across those who benefit from their infliction-usually, all those who benefit from
the enterprise. In the product context, for example, enterprise liability prescribes that the costs
[Vol. 61:543552
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Now tort is no more than holding its own vis-A-vis property and con-
tract, and fault is triumphant within tort. In this landscape, Rylands
itself is curiously embattled. Eminent courts and tort scholars re-
hearse long-standing doubts that it is no more than a garden-variety
nuisance case or assimilate it into negligence of a res ipsa loquitur
variety.35 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm takes the position that there is no general principle
of strict liability, just pockets of strict liability.36 Rylands is counter-
evidence to this claim.
Interpretations that either deny the strictness of Rylands or domes-
ticate that strictness by presenting it as the routine application of an-
cient forms of land-based liability are wrong, I think, and it seems
worth saying so-and why. Rylands is one of the principal common
law fonts of both modern strict liability and enterprise liability. It oc-
cupies this role precisely because the liability it recognizes transcends
the ancient doctrinal categories upon which the major opinions in the
case draw and because those opinions synthesize the ancient authori-
ties that they cite into a general conception of strict liability. We mis-
understand the case when we absorb it into negligence liability or
nuisance. Furthermore, we are unable to make much sense of its sem-
inal role in American tort law when we interpret it as merely negli-
gence or nuisance. At the very least, Rylands is the font and
of product-related accidents should be borne by the firms responsible for marketing the defec-
tive products responsible for the relevant harms and that those firms should disperse the costs of
such accidents among shareholders, employees, suppliers, and other customers of the firm. Lia-
bility for manufacturing defects is a stable instance of enterprise liability. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998). Early products liability law is generally
thought to have attempted to express enterprise liability ideas with respect to all categories of
product defects. See Keating, supra; Priest, supra. By contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability conceptualizes design defects and failures to warn in negligence terms. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
35. F. H. Newark is the most distinguished legal historian to absorb Rylands to nuisance. See
generally F. H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAw Q. REV. 480 (1949). Alan Brudner
classifies Rylands as a nuisance case and the abnormally dangerous activity liability that it has
fathered as really a form of negligence liability. ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON
LAw 327 n.87 (1995). Ernest Weinrib assimilates Rylands into a res ipsa version of negligence.
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 187-89 (1995). Arthur Ripstein, wrestles un-
easily with Rylands and struggles to assimilate it into negligence liability on the theory that the
choice of activity triggers a special duty of care; namely, to keep the water at the owner's peril.
See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAw 70-71 (1999). English courts
appear much more attracted than American ones to cabining Rylands as an instance of nuisance
liability. See Cambridge Water Co. v. E. Cntys. Leather PLC, [1994] All E.R. 53 (H.L.) 58-59
("Nuisance . . . is a congener of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, but the former usually focuses on
the acts of the defendant whilst the latter always focuses on the event of an escape of some
mischievous thing which the defendant brought onto his land." (citation omitted)).
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 4,
scope note (2010).
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inspiration of "abnormally dangerous activity liability," and it seems
fair to say that it is one of the two principal common law fonts (vicari-
ous liability is the other) of enterprise liability.3 7
In probing Rylands, moreover, we are probing interesting tensions
in Rabin's own work. As much as any prominent tort scholar of the
past fifty years, Rabin has been sympathetic to the expansiveness of
mid-twentieth-century American tort law as embodied in the jurispru-
dence of the California and New Jersey courts. The Fault Principle
itself evidences, or at least prefigures, such sympathy in its receptivity
to the idea that economic loss and emotional harm might both be
proper subjects for tort liability.38 Later writings develop this instinct,
while other articles examine the expansive role of enterprise liability
within negligence, both directly and in conjunction with enabling torts.
By taking a broader view of the way that multiple actions and activi-
ties combine to inflict harms, enabling torts involve a retreat from the
rigidly individualistic assumptions of late nineteenth-century fault lia-
bility and a corresponding embrace of a more collective conception of
responsibility.39
The upshot of this is that enterprise liability is a powerful theme in
Rabin's work, but it is a theme that is worked out largely with refer-
ence to negligence law. The lessons learned from inquiring into the
often subterranean influence of enterprise liability conceptions within
negligence law are invaluable, but they are also incomplete. Enter-
prise liability reaches its fullest flower within forms of strict liability.
Indeed, it is arguable that the flowering of enterprise liability in strict
liability forms-preeminently, in early products liability law-is the
single feature that most distinguishes the tort regime constructed by
the California and New Jersey Supreme Courts from the refined and
powerful form of fault liability developed by Cardozo and the New
York Court of Appeals earlier in the twentieth century.40 Rylands
matters to the rise of modern tort liability because it is a genuinely
seminal case with respect to the articulation of strict liability as a gen-
eral form of tort liability.
37. On the common law fonts of strict liability, see Keating, supra note 34, at 1303-08,
1317-29.
38. See Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 948-52.
39. See generally Rabin, Enabling Torts, supra note 2.
40. "Arguable" is the right word here because important developments, including the partial
rejection of the status categories in landowner liability cases, are expressions of the extension of
fault liability.
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Recovering Rylands is, in short, worth our while, and the way to
begin that endeavor is by rereading Rylands.41 The opinions them-
selves make the case that the liability imposed transcends the tradi-
tional forms of nuisance-based and trespassory liability that are the
authority for Rylands's rule of strict liability. Before we begin reread-
ing Rylands, however, it may help to detour briefly and review just
why and how it is that the principal property torts-trespass, nuisance,
and conversion-are both intentional and strict.
B. Property and Strict Liability
Fault liability is liability that attaches to conduct that is unjustified
or wrong. A judgment of fault criticizes the conduct responsible for
the tort in question: a negligently caused accident, for example, is an
accident caused by a risk that should not have been imposed. Strict
liability, by contrast, attaches to conduct that is justified or innocent.
This distinction has to do with the basis of liability-whether liability
is based on the wrongfulness of the primary conduct responsible for
the injury-and it therefore cuts across the tripartite classification of
torts into intentional, negligent, and strict. Intentional torts can be
strict, and as we shall see shortly, the property torts usually are both
strict and intentional.
In modern American tort law, strict liability comes in two forms.
One form is epitomized in the torts of conversion, trespass, and cer-
tain batteries.42 Here, the wrong is the violation of a right that assigns
a power of control over some physical object or, in the case of battery,
41. This is not to deny the importance of the historical context. Interested readers should
consult A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 239 n.117 (1984).
42. Among batteries, medical batteries tend to provide the most vivid illustration of liability
predicated on a boundary crossing to which consent has not been given. In Mohr v. Williams, for
example, the defendant physician was liable for operating on one of plaintiff's ears without per-
mission. See 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905). The defendant had permission to operate on the
other ear. Id. After anesthetizing the patient, the defendant doctor discovered that the diseased
condition was in the ear on which he did not have permission to operate. Id. He operated
anyway and cured the condition, thereby benefitting the plaintiff. Id. Nonetheless, the doctor
was liable for battery because he intentionally touched a part of plaintiff's person without per-
mission, thereby denying her authority over her own body. Id. at 14-15. His intention in doing
so was benign, not malevolent. See id. at 13.
For a vivid illustration of the same principle at work in trespass, see Longenecker v. Zimmer-
man, 267 P.2d 543 (Kan. 1954). Believing that cedar trees near the boundary of her property
were on her side, the defendant had them topped, trimmed, and cleaned of bagworms. Id. at
544. In fact, they were on the plaintiffs property. Id. The defendant had trespassed and was
liable for "at least nominal damages, even though [the plaintiff] was actually benefitted by the
act of the defendant." Id. at 545. The defendant's trespass consisted, of course, in the inten-
tional but innocent act of crossing the boundary of plaintiff's property without permission and
thereby denying her sovereignty over her own land. See id.
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control over some subject. The law's specification of various powers
of control over one's person and physical objects gives rise to a form
of strict liability predicated on the voluntary, but impermissible, cross-
ing of a boundary. If you enter another's land, or appropriate an-
other's pen, without permission, you have violated her right of
exclusive control over these objects even if your entry is entirely rea-
sonable and justified. The wrong consists of the failure to respect the
right. Fault is simply irrelevant.43 Put otherwise, liability for violation
of a right of exclusive control is strict for the simple reason that the
right itself would be fatally compromised by tolerating all reasonable
(or justified) boundary crossings without regard to whether consent
was given to those crossings. Rights of control are a species of auton-
omy rights. Those who hold such rights are entitled to forbid even
reasonable boundary crossings, and they are presumptively wronged
whenever their boundaries are crossed without permission. Their
rights thus give rise to stringent "duties to succeed" on the part of
others.44 In this class of cases, the strictness of liability in tort is the
consequence of the right being protected.
The other kind of strict liability in modern tort law applies to some
torts that involve the infliction of harm, not the unauthorized crossing
of a boundary. This kind of strict liability resembles the public law of
eminent domain, not fault liability in tort. Eminent domain law holds
that it is permissible for the government to take property for public
use only if the government pays just compensation to those whose
property it takes.45 This is a two-part criterion. First, the taking must
The tort of conversion likewise requires only the intent to exercise dominion over a chattel,
beyond one's right to do so-neither intent to injure nor intent to commit a wrong are necessary.
See Krusi v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 664, 672 (1983). One may be innocently and
reasonably mistaken in thinking that one does own the property, or has permission to use or
harm it, and still commit the tort. See id. ("[A]n action for conversion rests simply upon the
interference with the plaintiff's dominion over his property. The action is a species of strict
liability in which the defendant's good faith, due care, ignorance or mistake are irrelevant . . . .").
43. In the famous case of Vosburg v. Putney, the defendant child's battery (his kicking of the
plaintiff) was innocent horseplay. 50 N.W. 403, 403 (Wis. 1891). It was nonetheless a battery
because defendant crossed the boundary of plaintiff's person without permission. Id. "A bat-
tery . . . requires intentional bodily contact which is either harmful or offensive [but] that does
not mean that the person has to intend that the contact be harmful or offensive." White v. Univ.
of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instructively, children can commit batteries even when they are too young to be "at fault" and
therefore liable for negligence. See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
Liability in battery can thus be strict; it can be imposed on the basis of an innocent intention to
commit the act that is the unauthorized contact.
44. The concept of "duties to succeed" is developed by John Gardner in Obligations and Out-
comes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING To RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORP ON His
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001).
45. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003).
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be justified; that is, it must be for a public use.4 6 Second, compensa-
tion must be paid for the property taken.47 In parallel fashion, the
second kind of strict liability in tort holds that it is permissible to un-
dertake certain actions and activities only when two conditions are
met. First, the acts and activities must be conducted reasonably. Sec-
ond, those who undertake those acts and activities must repair any
physical harm done by their conduct.48 Whereas negligence liability is
predicated on primary criticism of conduct, strict liability is predicated
on secondary criticism of conduct. In negligence, the infliction of the
harm is wrongful; in strict liability, the failure to step forward and re-
pair a harm faultlessly inflicted is wrongful. Strict liability asserts that
the costs of necessary or justified harms should be borne by those who
benefit from their infliction and not by those with the misfortune to
find themselves in the path of valuable activity.
This second form of strict liability is embodied by a diverse set of
doctrines: by private necessity cases such as Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transportation Co.,49 by liability for abnormally dangerous activi-
ties,50 by some liability for intentional nuisance,51 by liability for man-
ufacturing defects in products liability law, and by the liability of
masters for the torts of their servants committed within the scope of
their employment. The obligation imposed by these doctrines is an
obligation to undertake an action (for example, saving your ship from
destruction at the hands of a hurricane by bashing the dock to which
the ship is moored) or conduct an activity (for example, operating a
business firm) only on the condition that you will repair any physical
harm for which your action or activity is responsible. The reciprocal
right is a right to have any physical harm done to you undone by the
party responsible for its infliction.
To be sure, the doctrine that has just been summarized is modern,
but the point being made holds true about the law on which Rylands
drew in its formulation of a general principle of strict liability. Ry-
lands appealed to ancient land-based strict liabilities, some of which
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. This "private eminent domain" conception of strict liability may receive its first theoretical
articulation in the writings (some famous and some obscure) of Oliver Wendell Holmes. These
writings are cited and discussed in Grey, supra note 31, at 1275-81. Two other classic statements
are Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Prop-
erty and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1925), and Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in
the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959).
49. 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910).
50. See generally Ken Kress, The Seriousness of Harm Thesis for Abnormally Dangerous Ac-
tivities, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 277 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
51. Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2012).
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sounded in trespass and others of which sounded in nuisance. Then,
as now, liability in trespass was strict because it was grounded on un-
authorized entry of land, not on unjustified or faulty entry of land.
Liability in nuisance was strict because it was founded on unreasona-
ble harm, not on unreasonable conduct.52
III. REREADING RYLANDS
The essential facts of Rylands are simple. A reservoir, which Ry-
lands had constructed on his land, collapsed because it had been built
on top of the partially silted shafts of an old mine.53 Those shafts con-
nected with Fletcher's mine. 54 Rylands had hired independent con-
tractors to construct the reservoir, selecting competent ones who had
nonetheless failed to detect and take proper account of the concealed
shafts. 55 There was therefore negligence, but no negligence that could
be imputed to Rylands.56 Fletcher prevailed at a jury trial, and the
court ordered the arbitrator not to make an award, but rather to state
the case for the consideration of the Court of Exchequer. The Court
of Exchequer gave judgment for Rylands.57 Three opinions issued,
two supporting the judgment for Rylands.58
A. The Opinions in the Exchequer Court
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the opinions is that they
agreed on the lack of a controlling rule and hence on the need to
settle the matter by recourse to principle. 59 They also agreed on the
nature of the issue it presented; namely, that it was a matter of liability
for injury that was both unintentional and not negligent. Chief Baron
Pollock stated the issue this way:
[Flor what acts done on his own land (and apparently quite lawful),
is the owner of an estate liable, if it should turn out in the result that
damage is thereby occasioned to the estate of another (who may be
an immediate or a distant neighbour) on account of some circum-
52. That traditional nuisance law was concerned with unreasonable impact and not with un-
reasonable conduct in the negligence sense of the term is shown persuasively by Richard A.
Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49,
53-56 (1979).
53. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. Div.).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. As Baron Bramwell put it, "[W]hile it is always desirable to ascertain the principle on
which a case depends, it is especially so here." Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. at 743 (Baron Bramwell).
Baron Pollock concurred. Id. at 747 (Chief Baron Pollock concurring).
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stance entirely unknown to the proprietor who causes the act to be
done.60
For his part, Chief Baron Pollock saw the case as a "water case" and
concluded that there was insufficient authority to decide in favor of
Fletcher.61 Baron Bramwell saw the case more or less the same way,
but drew the opposite conclusion; namely, that Fletcher had a right
against "water artificially brought or sent to him directly, or indirectly
by its being sent to where it would flow to him." 62 Rylands, by con-
trast, had no right to engage in an activity that inflicted water on
Fletcher. Fletcher's right, Rylands's lack of any right, and the harm
inflicted were enough to support a finding of liability.63 Baron Martin,
for his part, thought that the case did not meet the technical require-
ments of either trespass or nuisance. There was no trespass because
the damages were consequential, not direct: the filling of the reservoir
was not continuous with the flooding of Fletcher's mine.64 There was
no nuisance because nuisance required the creation of a continuous
condition that injured Fletcher's property or his enjoyment of it.65
Consequently, the complaint was an action on the case and, though
there was no direct authority on point, the collision cases were the
appropriate analogy. The collision cases required negligence.66
The opinions of the Exchequer Court have not had an enormous
influence on subsequent understandings of the case, but they do
powerfully illustrate one of its essential features; namely, that the facts
did not fit into preexisting doctrinal pigeonholes and had to be de-
60. Id. at 747.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 743 (Baron Bramwell).
63. Id.
64. Had the reservoir collapsed instantaneously, Rylands's innocent act of pouring water into
his own reservoir would have been the trespass of pouring water directly into Fletcher's mine.
Innocent though Rylands's intention would have been, it would nonetheless have been an inten-
tion to commit an act that was a trespass.
65. Though the matter is not free from doubt, Baron Martin appears to be correct about this.
See Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (pt. 1), 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 306 (1911),
reprinted in FRANCIs H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 344 (1926) (discussing the
traditional action for the assize of nuisance).
66. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 at 745-46 (Baron Bramwell). Of these three opinions in the
Exchequer Court, only Baron Bramwell's is enduringly important. It goes beyond the special
context of rights with respect to water and supports its position by more general argument.
Baron Bramwell asserts that the case could be viewed as trespass, as nuisance, or as an action on
the case and that Rylands should lose on all three of these views. See id. at 744. The case, he
thought, was governed by the nonfault principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non ledas. Id. Negli-
gence was required only in collision cases, in which strict liability does not work because it is
impossible to assign responsibility for the harm to either party without deploying a fault crite-
rion. See id. In other words, he saw highway accidents as a special case in which the kind of
causal indeterminacy that Coase made famous precludes nonfault liability. See id.
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cided on first principles of responsibility for harm done. Reaching a
decision in Rylands thus required generalization. 67
B. The Opinions in the Exchequer Chamber
Rylands became a canonical case only when the Exchequer Cham-
ber unanimously reversed the Exchequer Court.68 Justice Blackburn's
opinion for the Exchequer Chamber states a rule of strict liability for
escaping things69 defeasible only by a showing that the harm should be
charged to something other than his agency in bringing it onto his
property ("vis major, or the act of God").70 Justice Blackburn's opin-
ion is, along with Lord Cairn's opinion in the House of Lords, one of
the most important opinions in the case and one of the primary pieces
of evidence supporting the thesis that Rylands does indeed articulate a
general principle of strict liability.71
The precedent that Justice Blackburn cites in support of his ruling
consists of nuisance cases ("noisome vapors"), trespassing cattle, and
other escaping things (for example, the invasion of one person's cellar
by filth from another's privy). 72 All of these are presented as in-
stances of a general strict liability for escaping things; the rule of the
case is thus stated broadly. Fault, the opinion firmly asserts, is no part
of these forms of liability.73 While nuisance cases figure prominently
in the precedents cited, the harm is not the kind of continuous inter-
ference with another's use and enjoyment of her property with which
the law of nuisance is concerned, but the kind of sudden explosion of
a standing risk into injury with which the law of accidents proper is
67. Compare Bohlen, supra note 65, at 315-17 (explaining how American courts strongly re-
sisted the articulation of general principles in cases that fell into preexisting pigeonholes), with
Abraham, supra note 33, at 214 (explaining how the transition from the writ system to modern
procedural law fueled the need for generalization).
68. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265.
69. Id. at 279 (Blackburn J.) ("[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril . . . .").
70. Id. at 280.
71. In an opinion in the House of Lords, Lord Cranworth's agreed that Justice Blackburn got
the rule right, but made arguments of principle that add to the articulation of the morality that
justifies the rule. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. 330 (H.L.) at 340-41 (Lord
Cranworth). Lord Cranworth asserted that the infliction of injury itself gave rise to issues of
responsibility, that justice called for holding someone who inflicts injury in the course of pursu-
ing his own private benefit responsible for the injury done, and that the sic utere principle that
figured so prominently in Baron Bramwell's opinion justified the imposition of liability. Id. I
quote some of Lord Cranworth's rhetoric later in this Article. See infra note 109 and accompa-
nying text.
72. Rylands, 1 L.R. Exch. at 280-86.
73. Id. at 287.
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concerned. As Warren Seavey said half a century ago, "There was no
nuisance in Fletcher v. Rylands."7 4 The building of a reservoir is not
itself a nuisance, and when a reservoir collapses, what has transpired is
an accident-a standing risk has exploded into harm. When a risk of
harm gives rise to an interference with the reasonable use and enjoy-
ment of land, nuisance and accident law overlap, formally speaking.
Substantively, accident law eclipses nuisance and governs the rights of
the parties. Nuisance, as a distinctive form of liability in tort, makes
its presence felt only in a special class of intentional wrongs.7 5 The
law of nuisance, in short, is not about accidents, and Rylands was an
accident.
There was also no trespass in Rylands, albeit by a narrow factual
margin. The shaft did not give way at the very moment that the reser-
voir was filled, but a few days later. In older language, this delay in-
terrupted the chain of causation and prevented the injury from being
"direct." 76 In more modem language, there was no act that was also
74. Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 984, 986 (1952).
75. Compare id. at 986-87, 995, with Keating, supra note 51, at 12-13. As Seavey explains,
intentional nuisance is a distinctive form of liability because it is not predicated on general negli-
gence principles:
In cases where the conduct is wrongful either because the defendant is improperly caus-
ing noises, smells, vibrations or other harmful effects on the plaintiffs land or in cases
where the defendant by the continuance of his activity creates undue risk to structures
or persons on the plaintiff's land, it is clear that the activity is wrongful and cannot be
made rightful by the fact that the utmost care is used in minimizing harm.
Seavey, supra note 74, at 986-87. Thus, when the mere continuance of an activity inflicts a
tortious harm by virtue of its unreasonable impact, any sentient actor will have the minimum
intention necessary to commit an intentional tort-namely, "substantial certainty" that harm will
be inflicted. By contrast, "[w]here there is a nuisance because of risk of harm, nuisance overlaps
negligence." Id. at 995. Seavey was writing in 1952. English law has since at least attempted to
absorb Rylands into nuisance law. See Cambridge Water Co. v. E. Cntys. Leather PLC, [1994]
All L.R. (H.L.). This changes (or attempts to change) the law of nuisance. Seavey's statement
that "[t]here was no nuisance in Fletcher v. Rylands" was thus correct when it was written but is
contestable now. For its part, Cambridge Water Co. is an attempt at revising the law of nuisance
because it introduces a form of strict liability for accidentally inflicted harm into English nui-
sance law.
76. This was, of course, Baron Martin's view in the Exchequer Court. To be fair, it can be
controverted. The principal authority for the view that trespass need not be direct and can be
effected indirectly by a force set in motion by the defendant appears to be Gregory v. Piper,
which itself cites ample ancient authority. See (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B.) 221. Of course,
disentangling our nominate tort of trespass from the ancient form of action complicates this
question. Nonetheless, it is important to note two facts. First, the view of Rylands as trespass
simply did not attract support among the opinions. Baron Bramwell's opinion that the case
could be thought of as trespass, as nuisance, or as a water rights case leant the most support to
the view. The lesson of that view is really that Rylands transcends the standard doctrinal pige-
onholes. Second, Bohlen's classic article on the case persuasively argues that, although the fac-
tual line separating Rylands from a garden-variety trespass is slender, it is also real. See Bohlen,
supra note 65, at 311.
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an entry of the plaintiff's property, an unauthorized and intentional
crossing of plaintiff's property line. The act was to fill the reservoir,
and that act was not an unauthorized entry of the plaintiff's property
because the water did not enter the plaintiff's property until several
days later, after the act had been completed. Thus, had the water
seeped out of the reservoir on a regular basis and substantially in-
creased the existing percolation of water through Fletcher's mine,
there would have been a nuisance (a continuous condition interfering
with the use and enjoyment of the mine). Had the shaft collapsed at
the time the reservoir was filled, there would have been a trespass.
But neither of these happened. Rylands involved an accident, not an
intentional wrong. Consequently, the case did not quite fit into the
long-standing nominate tort boxes that Justice Blackburn cited as pre-
cedent, and the significance of that fact was not lost on Justice Black-
burn. He articulated a "general rule" of strict liability precisely
because the preexisting doctrinal pigeonholes did not cover the case at
hand.7 7
Justice Blackburn remarked that his "general rule" of strict liability
for escaping things "seems on principle just."78 Fletcher had been
"damnified without any fault of his own." 7 9 It is a very short step
from these observations-nothing more than a paraphrase of them,
really-to the basic moral intuition behind strict liability. Rylands
should bear the cost of the harm he inflicted on Fletcher, but not be-
cause he wrongly risked that harm. He did not. The negligence of his
independent contractor was not imputable to him, and his own con-
duct was faultless. Rylands should bear the cost of the harm he in-
flicted on Fletcher because the risk issued from his activity, reasonable
though his conduct may have been. People who choose to impose
risks on others should not be entitled to cast the costs of their choices
(their actions and activities) onto others. To borrow the language that
Losee v. Buchanan quotes from Blackstone, this is the principle of
"meum and tuum."80 I must bear the costs of my activities, and you
must bear the costs of yours. By putting the matter in general lan-
guage, Justice Blackburn's opinion makes plain the fact that strict lia-
bility, like the fault principle with which it competes, is an intuitively
plausible and general principle of responsibility.
77. Rylands, 1 L.R. Exch. at 279-80 (Blackburn J.).
78. Id. at 280.
79. Id.
80. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 483 (1873) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 209 (1768)).
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In Justice Blackburn's opinion, we thus find the first reason that the
case has resonated down through tort history and is indelibly identi-
fied with strict liability. Justice Blackburn's opinion is formidably
powerful on the facts. Fletcher was "damnified without any fault of
his own," and there is a devastating loss that must fall on someone.81
It seems only fair that it falls on Rylands. He risked the harm, he
stood to gain from the imposition of the risk, and, though he had
moral and legal license to put his own property at risk, it is difficult to
explain why he had comparable license to put anyone else's property
at risk. The principle that "I should bear the harms attributable to my
activities and you should bear the harms attributable to yours" is an
intuitively powerful principle of fairness. Unless we think that it is
impossible to attribute harms to activities, this principle of fairness
leads to strict, not fault, liability.82
When the case for strict liability is stated in this intuitively powerful
but fully general way, the question becomes, why is the whole of the
law of accidents not governed by the principle of strict liability? If
that thought arises immediately and naturally, it also invites immedi-
ate recoil. We are taught that no idea is more inimical to late nine-
teenth-century tort law than the idea that people generally act at their
peril. Justice Blackburn's famous, incompletely developed distinction
between the sphere of the highway and the sphere within which this
accident falls gestures toward an answer to this question and so to-
ward a limit on strict liability, but it does no more than stimulate pos-
sible answers.83 One salient possibility is essentially the answer that
Rabin gives when he suggests that "virtually unlimited enjoyment of
one's own land was a two-sided coin, at once supporting a conditional
freedom to maintain land as one wished, and, at the same time, pro-
moting a conditional freedom affirmatively to enjoy one's land with-
out interference."8 Rylands is neither a nuisance case nor a trespass
case, but property rights to the exclusive possession and quiet enjoy-
ment of land bear on the case. One thought that arises quite immedi-
81. Rylands, 1 L.R. Exch. at 280 (Blackburn J.).
82. The idea that it is causally impossible to attribute harms to activities absent a fault crite-
rion is, loosely speaking, Coasean, but it has attracted adherents among tort scholars whose
views are not at all Coasean. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 35, at 49-51; Jules Coleman & Arthur
Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 McGILL L.J. 91, 94-95 (1995); Stephen R. Perry, The
Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 147, 147-48 (1988).
83. Highway collision cases preoccupied the Exchequer Court. Justice Blackburn's discussion
references Baron Martin's opinion.
84. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 936. Francis Bohlen develops this idea. See
Bohlen, supra note 65, at 317-25. Insofar as this view tends to imply a certain bias in favor of the
landowning classes, it is not supported either by the facts of Rylands or the biographies of the
judges who participated in its decisions. See Abraham, supra note 33, at 219-20.
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ately is that these property rights justify both applying strict liability to
accidental harms arising out of the use of land and limiting strict liabil-
ity to accidental harms involving property.8 5
A second salient interpretation (made famous by George Fletcher)
invokes ideas of reciprocity by suggesting a distinction between
spheres of reciprocal and nonreciprocal risk. The sphere of the high-
way is a sphere of reciprocal risk within which each of us is better off
bearing the nonnegligent costs of others' activities because we are
compensated by the right to impose "in-kind" risks on those others.8 6
The sphere of land-based activities is a sphere of nonreciprocal risk
within which the balance of burdens and benefits is more fairly struck
if each party bears the nonnegligent costs of their own activities. Jus-
tice Blackburn's inchoate distinction invites both of these different in-
terpretations, and they point in different directions. The first
interpretation invokes property rights as its guiding idea; the second
invokes interpersonal fairness. Reciprocal risks are prima facie fair
whereas nonreciprocal risks are prima facie unfair.
These two interpretations, moreover, do not exhaust the possibili-
ties. At least one other interpretation is salient as well. This third
interpretation reads Justice Blackburn to intimate that people choose
to bear the risk of highway accidents by venturing out onto the road,
but do not choose to accept the risks of their neighbor's land use by
staying quietly at home. This interpretation, however, begs the ques-
tion it purports to answer. The claim that people choose to bear the
risk of highway accidents is crippled by an unavoidable and vicious
circularity: the rule of liability determines the risks that people do, in
fact, bear. Once that rule is settled, people choose in light of it, but
until that rule is settled, it is simply unclear what risks people are
choosing to bear. The choice between negligence and strict liability
thus determines the risks that people choose to bear by entering onto
the highway, not the other way around. The right and reciprocity in-
terpretations, by contrast, are not circular. We can speak about the
distribution of risk-and about the property rights that people have to
the use and enjoyment of their property-without assuming a rule
that allocates the harms flowing from the risks under discussion. The
reciprocity and property rights criteria are logically independent of
the risk allocation at issue.
85. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537, 543 (1972).
86. Id. at 542, 572.
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C. The Opinions in the House of Lords
The case did not end in the Exchequer Chamber, of course, and we
are not left with only Justice Blackburn's cryptic theorization. Ry-
lands appealed and the case proceeded to the House of Lords, where
the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was affirmed.87 The opinion
of Lord Cairns in the House of Lords was the other great opinion in
the case. It accepted the application of strict liability, holding that
Rylands's liability hinges on the distinction between natural and non-
natural use of the land.88 Lord Cairns's distinction has been the sub-
ject of much debate. 89 Its interpretation has an enormous influence
on the scope of the doctrine articulated by Rylands and even on
whether that doctrine should be understood as a true strict liability
doctrine or as a kind of covert negligence liability. On the more literal
line of interpretation, the distinction marked is between "natural" and
"artificial," between what is imputable to human agency or choice and
what is not. This is strict liability, liability based on what the injurer
has done, not on what the injurer has wrongly done. On the other,
looser line of interpretation, the distinction is between customary and
unusual, and this can be reconstructed as a distinction between rea-
sonable and unreasonable, faulty and justified.90 To recover Rylands,
we must recover the meaning of this distinction.
In his classic article, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, Francis H.
Bohlen argued that a "natural" use of land referred to a small number
of uses that were "permitted, even though they interfered with the
extreme proprietary rights of neighboring owners."91 These uses were
either nearly universal or especially suited to the particular piece of
87. See Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
88. Lord Cairns uses the language "natural user" and "non-natural" use. Id. at 338-39. I shall
continue with "natural" and "non-natural" use.
89. See John S. Brearley, Public Welfare v 'Natural Use' of Land as the Basis for Liability in
Environmental Damage Cases: Some Perspectives on the Past and Possible Future Roles of Tor-
tious Remedies, 7 J. ENvL. L. 119, 121 (1995); F. H. Newark, Non-Natural User and Rylands v.
Fletcher, 24 MOD. L. REv. 557 (1961).
90. This strategy is very clearly illustrated by Alan Brudner:
It has become customary to view [liability resulting from ultrahazardous activities] as
strict, but it is really a form of negligence liability. Negligence consists in the imposition
of socially abnormal risk on someone to whom one owes a duty of care. The crucial
feature of ultrahazardous activities (including the keeping of dangerous animals) is
that, if carried on in populated areas, no practicable precautionary steps can bring the
risk down to the socially normal. Thus, neither Rylands itself nor the ultrahazardous
activities rubric is exceptional.
BRUDNER, supra note 35, at 327 n.87. The strategy is part of the line of scholarship that reinter-
prets "natural" as customary or usual and "non-natural" as abnormal or unusual. See infra note
97 and accompanying text.
91. Bohlen, supra note 65, at 320.
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land at issue. Dwellings are an example of a nearly universal use; oc-
cupied land must contain dwellings. A vein of rare minerals beneath a
particular plot of land makes that property peculiarly suited to a par-
ticular use: mining. The set of "natural uses of land" identified a lim-
ited number of activities that could inflict harms on other property
owners without running afoul of the normal baseline of property
rights prescribing strict duties of non-interference. Bohlen explains:
The universally permitted uses were those to which mankind at the
very beginning of private ownership had put land which, thus, by
tradition based on immemorial usage, had come to be regarded as
the uses for which nature had designed land for human enjoy-
ment-or uses for which the physical nature of the land itself
marked it as peculiarly adapted to satisfy the pressing needs of a
primitive society. . . . They were uses which must be enjoyed, if at
all, wherever the land was situated; the owner had no choice as to
where he would use his land for these purposes. Land must be culti-
vated where it lay, homes built wherever man owned land, mines
developed where nature had deposited minerals.
Land, as such, was marked out by tradition and immemorial us-
age as primarily fitted for homes and farming, land containing min-
erals was equally marked out by the most pressing needs of
primitive society as appropriate for mining. Such uses were, there-
fore, regarded as "natural" the generic name given to them by Lord
Cairns in Rylands v. Fletcher, as uses determined not by the choice
or needs of any individual owner, but by the very nature of the land,
as such, or by the particular nature of the particular land. 92
Thus, harms attributable to "natural" uses are not attributable to
human agency; "natural" uses of land are not chosen by owners but
forced upon them by the character of the land itself. Cairns's princi-
ple is thus a principle of strict liability in the sense that it holds people
responsible for harms flowing from their agency-their voluntary
choices-whether or not they exercised reasonable care. The release
of water in Rylands flowed from human agency, not from the very
small set of "natural" uses of land. Therefore, for Bohlen, Justice
Blackburn's ruling is correct.
A substantial body of modern scholarship, however, rejects Boh-
len's interpretation of Lord Cairns's distinction. This scholarship res-
92. Id. at 320-21 (emphasis added). In a footnote, Bohlen illustrates the principles with a
riparian rights example:
So, in the appropriation of the water of a stream, an upper owner might take all he
needed for the natural use of his land, for the needs of his household or of his farm, for
drinking, washing and watering his cattle, even though he exhausted the supply and so
prevented a similar appropriation by the lower owners; but he could not take any water
for other purposes, even for manufacture, if the usual flow of the water was sensibly
affected.
Id. at 321 n.25.
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onates with (and perhaps even begins from) the strange sound that the
expression "natural" use of land has to contemporary ears. "Uses"
are, to the modern ear, inherently artificial; people use land, and
"uses" are therefore the expression of human artifice. George
Fletcher, among others, advances this alternative interpretation in
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, claiming that "natural" means cus-
tomary, usual, or normal and that "non-natural" means unusual or
abnormal. 93 Landes and Posner make a nearly identical assertion in
their book, The Economic Structure of Tort Law.9 4
This interpretation of "non-natural" as "unusual" stands Bohlen's
reading of Cairns's opinion on its head. According to Bohlen, Lord
Cairns used the idea of natural uses to identify a small set of uses that
cannot be said to have been "chosen."95 That small set of uses was
not subject to strict liability, while departures from that set are so sub-
ject. Nonliability is an exception carved out of a general regime of
strict liability, and a relatively small exception to boot. When "natu-
ral" is interpreted as "usual," however, norm and exception are re-
versed. Negligence becomes the general rule governing "normal"
uses and strict liability is reserved for uncommon-indeed "inappro-
priate"-uses.96 This recasts Rylands's embrace of strict liability in a
much more restrictive way. Indeed, making customary usage the key
to the imposition of liability in Rylands goes a great distance toward
bringing the case within a fault framework. Custom might fix the ap-
propriate level of risk imposition at both the negligence and activity
levels. Those who impose abnormal risks are liable in both cases.
Negligence liability attaches to negligent acts because they impose
more risk than normal actions do. Strict liability applies to activities
because they impose more risk than normal activities do.97
93. See Fletcher, supra note 85, at 545 ("The fact was that the defendant sought to use his land
for a purpose at odds with the use of land then prevailing in the community.").
94. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAw 112 (1987) ("[T]he construction of a reservoir was . .. an unnatural land use in the sense of
unusual . . . .").
95. Bohlen, supra note 65, at 321.
96. See Fletcher, supra note 85, at 545.
97. Fletcher's and Landes and Posner's views of Rylands are similar, but not wholly congru-
ent. Preeminently, Landes and Posner conceive of negligence as inefficient risk, not as socially
excessive risk. The point in the text comes much closer, therefore, to the kind of view that
Brudner advances. Recall that he writes:
It has become customary to view [liability resulting from ultrahazardous activities] as
strict, but it is really a form of negligence liability. Negligence consists in the imposition
of socially abnormal risk on someone to whom one owes a duty of care. The crucial
feature of ultrahazardous activities (including the keeping of dangerous animals) is
that, if carried on in populated areas, no practicable precautionary steps can bring the
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Bohlen, however, seems to have gotten the better of the historical
argument. In Non-Natural User and Rylands v. Fletcher, F. H. New-
ark examines the original meaning of the phrase "natural" as used in
Cairns's opinion and the subsequent transformation of the phrase's
meaning.98 Later interpreters of Rylands, Newark argues, have all but
stood Cairns on his head by reinterpreting "artificial" to mean "not
usual."
We must pay a tribute to Lord Cairns for making it quite clear what
he meant. He contrasts "natural use" and "non-natural use"; he
goes on to define "non-natural use" as "introducing into the close
that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it," and he
relates the definition more precisely to the facts before him by say-
ing "for the purpose of introducing water in quantities and in a
manner not the result of any operation in or under the land." . . .
Lord Cairns' non-natural user is therefore merely expression of the
fact that the defendant has artificially introduced on to the land a
new and dangerous agent.99
Cairns's clarity, however, could not save him from becoming misun-
derstood, in part because the word "natural" has a secondary, as well
as a primary, meaning: "'Natural' means primarily that which exists in
or by nature and is not artificial: but in the secondary sense it can
mean that which is ordinary and usual, even though it may be
artificial." 00
Cairns's fate, then, was to have the secondary meaning of "natural"
displace the primary, drastically narrowing the scope of his principle
of strict liability:
[W]hereas Lord Cairns asserted that bringing the dangerous agent
on to the land was necessarily "non-natural use" we are now led to
believe that it is only "non-natural" if it is "not ordinary." And the
result as applied in the modern cases is, we believe, one which
would have surprised Lord Cairns and astounded Blackburn J.101
Newark's article traces the history of this reversal of meaning in pains-
taking detail. Of particular interest is his assertion that "[t]he first
clear equation of Lord Cairns's 'natural use' with what is ordinary and
usual may be traced to Farrer v. Nelson in 1885."102 Lord Cairns's
risk down to the socially normal. Thus, neither Rylands itself nor the ultrahazardous
activities rubric is exceptional.
BRUDNER, supra note 35, at 327 n.87. Fletcher seems closer to Brudner than Landes and Posner.
See Fletcher, supra note 85, at 545 ("The fact was that the defendant sought to use his land for a
purpose at odds with the use of land then prevailing in the community.").
98. See generally Newark, supra note 89.
99. Id. at 561.
100. Id. at 558.
101. Id. at 571.
102. Id. at 566 (footnote omitted).
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contemporaries thus understood him correctly; misunderstanding did
not even begin to take root for almost twenty years.
Correct understanding of Cairns's distinction was not, moreover,
confined to England. At least some (and probably many) American
courts also grasped the distinction. Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co.10 3 is
an instructive case in point. Robb applies Lord Cairns's ideas of natu-
ral use to impose liability for actual damages-but not exemplary
damages-on the operation of coke ovens.104 The distinction between
natural and non-natural uses calls for this result:
The injury, if any, resulting from the manufacture of coke at this
site, is in no sense the natural and necessary consequence of the
exercise of the legal rights of the owner to develop the resources of
his property, but is the consequence of his election to devote his
land to the establishment of a particular sort of manufacturing, hav-
ing no natural connection with the soil or the subjacent strata. 05
On the one hand, the defendant enterprise must pay its own way;
the defendant "is serving himself in his own way, and has no right to
claim exemption from the natural consequences of his own act."106
Having acted voluntarily and for private advantage, the defendant
cannot foist the costs of its activity onto the plaintiff, who is a stranger
to the defendant's enterprise and will not profit from it. On the other
hand, the defendant should not be treated as a willful wrongdoer. The
plant is located on the defendant's own property, which the defendant
is free to use as he sees fit, and the defendant has conducted his activ-
ity carefully. "The harm done thereby to others was the least in
amount consistent with the natural and lawful use of its own."107
Correctly understood, Lord Cairns's opinion promotes an expansive
version of strict liability. It holds that harms flowing from uses of
property that are not necessary to the exercise of the legal right to use
and develop one's property-either in general or in connection with
the particular characteristics of the property at hand-ought to be
borne by the party in possession of the property, whether or not they
have exercised reasonable care.
D. Rylands and the Idea of Strict Liability
Strict liability in Rylands is tied to property rights to use and enjoy
land, but it is not identifiable only with ancient forms of land-based
103. See 22 A. 649 (Pa. 1891).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 651.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 650.
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liability that resist coherent generalization. Rylands's doctrine holds
that landowners are free to use their land for those uses that are nec-
essary to the exercise of their legal rights to enjoy and develop their
land and are subject to liability for harms to others attributable to any
other use of their land, even if they exercise reasonable care (or, for
that matter, more than reasonable care). The opinions in Rylands
thus state a general principle of strict liability in the way that canoni-
cal negligence opinions of the same period state a general principle of
responsibility for harm done. Just how far that principle extends is
debated by the judges themselves: Bramwell thinks that strict liability
governs everything except the highway collision cases and that those
cases are exempted only on causal grounds. Highway collision cases
are Coasean and, for Bramwell, the only truly Coasean cases. We can-
not attribute a collision on the highway to either party without some
criterion of fault.108 By contrast, in cases involving accidents among
landowners, we can determine who inflicted harm and who suffered
harm by appealing to the criterion of natural and non-natural use.
That criterion determines responsibility for harm done without ap-
pealing to, or evaluating, the reasonableness of the injurer's conduct.
By transcending the categories of nuisance and trespass, Rylands
states strict liability as a more general conception. The generality of
that conception is shown by the fact that it readily covers an accident
even though an accident is fundamentally different from an inten-
tional harm. Accidents arise out of risks and from the loss of control
over physical forces; intentional harms arise from physical forces
under the control of those who inflict them. This fact about the gener-
ality of the law that Rylands articulates is essential to the significance
of the case, but it may be less essential than the way in which the facts
and the opinions flesh out the intuitive moral case for strict liability as
a principle of liability competitive with fault and display the powerful
moral pull of strict liability. Fault liability appeals to the moral intui-
tion that people should be held responsible for the inadvertent harms
attributable to their conduct only when they have acted wrongly. Ry-
lands counters that the exercise of agency resulting in harm to some-
one else is morally significant-a reason that favors the imposition of
responsibility for the harm done. The injurer is the author of the
harm, and that authorship creates at least a prima facie reason to hold
the injurer responsible.
108. "Where two carriages come in collision, if there is no negligence in either it is as much
the act of the one driver as of the other that they meet." Fletcher v. Rylands, (1865) 159 Eng.
Rep. 737 (Ex. Div.) 744 (Bramwell J. dissenting); see also Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr.
739, 742 (Ct. App. 1971).
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Lord Cranworth voiced this intuition by writing: "when one person,
in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to
another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suf-
fer." 109 Rylands's conduct fell directly and immediately under this
principle, even though it was wholly free of fault.o10 But the intuitive
morality of strict liability embodied in Rylands does not rest solely on
the principle that the infliction of harm by one's agency creates a rea-
soning favoring responsibility for the harm done to the victim of that
harm. Though it is surely not an unjust enrichment or restitution case,
Rylands also rests on a principle of fairness akin to unjust enrichment.
When someone engages in an activity-constructing a reservoir for
their cotton mill, say-for his own private benefit, it is unfair for him
to reap the benefits of that activity but thrust its costs off onto those
persons he happens to harm in the course of "effect[ing] an object of
[his] own." People who pursue their own advantage and expect to
reap the rewards of the risks that they impose should take the bitter
with the sweet. That is, they should bear the financial costs of the
physical harms that issue from the risks they impose on others in pur-
suit of their own private gain.
The first of these two principles takes the exercise of agency result-
ing in the infliction of harm on another to be a reason counseling in
favor of responsibility for that harm. The second takes the pursuit of
one's own benefit-when done with the expectation that any benefits
that do accrue will accrue to one's private benefit-to create a claim
of fairness on the part of anyone harmed in the course of that pursuit.
Fletcher was not only "damnified" without any fault of his own, he
was also damnified without the exercise of any choice on his part to
bear the risk of reservoir collapse that ruined his mine. Furthermore,
Fletcher was damnified because Rylands exercised his agency to im-
pose that risk, and he was damnified without any expectation of bene-
fiting from the imposition of that risk. These are the intuitions that
justify holding Fletcher strictly liable for the harm that he has
inflicted.
109. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) at 341.
110. Id. at 342 ("The Defendants, in order to effect an object of their own, brought ... on to
land which for this purpose may be treated as being theirs, a large accumulated mass of water,
and stored it up in a reservoir. The consequence of this was damage to the Plaintiff, and for that
damage, however skillfully and carefully the accumulation was made, the Defendants ... were
certainly responsible."). Note that this principle connects strict liability in Rylands with another
ancient and enduring common law font of strict liability; namely, the vicarious responsibility of
masters for the torts of their servants committed within the scope of their employment. Such
torts are committed in the course of the master "managing his own affairs" and his responsibility
for those torts is predicated on this fact. Faulty management of the masters own affairs is not
necessary.
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Like the intuitive moral case for fault liability, the intuitions ex-
pressed by these premises are readily accessible and only presump-
tively persuasive. But their simplicity and directness are part of their
power. They resonate deeply with basic intuitions about responsibility
and fairness. To do harm is to be responsible in some way for the
harm that one has done, and the moral intuition that it is unfair to
inflict serious harms on others just because one stands to gain from
doing so is powerful. Harm to others is the kind of thing that moral
agents strenuously try to avoid. There is something morally wrong
with anyone who regards the infliction of serious harm on someone
else as a matter of no moral significance so long as the advantage they
gain from inflicting the harm outweighs the disadvantage that the vic-
tim suffers. There is something quite wrong with the moral makeup of
anyone who is not deeply invested in not harming others. Even una-
voidable harm, then, has moral significance. It is the kind of thing
that one would prefer never to do. Rylands's encapsulation of these
intuitions, and the immediate inference from them to strict liability,
frames the contest between negligence and strict liability as a standing
issue for the field of tort. We do both tort law and tort theory a disser-
vice when we obscure Rylands's distinctive ideas in a mistaken at-
tempt to absorb the case into fault liability. The cause of clarity is
better served by recognizing that Rylands really does extract a rela-
tively general conception of strict liability from ancient nuisance and
trespass cases and makes out a powerful prima facie case for the jus-
tice of such liability.
To be sure, tort scholars firmly committed to the fault principle are
not always persuaded of the power of these intuitions. Many of them
find the contrary intuition that harm faultlessly done is no different
from natural misfortune entirely persuasive. 1 It is far from clear
whether there is little or much to say about this impasse. One obser-
vation worth making, however, is that vast moral literature on moral
luck takes as one of its originating examples the regret that a truck
driver who-through no fault of his own-runs over a child will feel
simply because his agency is involved in the infliction of serious harm.
The truck driver will feel a remorse not shared by equally faultless
spectators to the event:
111. See, e.g., Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 82, at 113 ("For the agent who follows the
moral law, his agency-for which consequences of his or her actions he or she is responsible or
owns-pretty much ends with the intended consequences of his or her action.... Simply substi-
tute fault for the moral law. The person who is at fault opens himself or herself up to liability for
unintended consequences of his conduct, including some that would not have occurred but for
the conduct of others... .Fault, far from rendering causation and agency otiose, actually defines
the scope of their relevance.").
572 [Vol. 61:543
RECOVERING RYLANDS
The sentiment of agent-regret is by no means restricted to volun-
tary agency... . [E]ven at deeply accidental or non-voluntary levels
of agency, sentiments of agent-regret are different from regret in
general, such as might be felt by a spectator, and are acknowledged
in our practice as being different. The lorry driver who, through no
fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any specta-
tor, even a spectator next to him in the cab, except perhaps to the
extent that the spectator takes on the thought that he himself might
have prevented it, an agent's thought. . . . We feel sorry for the
driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that
there is something special about his relation to this happening,
something which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration
that it was not his fault.112
Agent-regret is not the topic here, but the regret that an agent who
inflicts inadvertent, faultless harm rightly feels about what he has
done is testament to the moral power of the intuition that the mere
doing of harm is a reason favoring responsibility. Faultless agency is
not morally the same as misfortune. It is a source of responsibility as
well as regret. There is all the more reason to favor responsibility
when harm is foreseeably risked and pursued for the agent's own
benefit.
In short, the basic moral intuitions that Rylands elicits from the
courts that wrestled with the case resonate with something deep in our
moral makeup. That is reason to take the strictness of Rylands both at
face value and seriously.
E. Fault Lines in Rylands
Scholars who deny the strictness of Rylands by reversing the pri-
mary and secondary meanings of the terms "natural" and "non-
natural" nonetheless have a point to make and a lesson to teach. Lim-
iting Rylands "to unusual and extraordinary uses which are fraught
with exceptional peril to others" 113 is generally taken to be the preva-
lent practice in American jurisdictions in the half century or so follow-
ing the case. This wisdom may stand in need of some revision, but it
112. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 27-28 (1981). Williams regards the regret appropri-
ate here as not a form of moral self-criticism because the agent has not done anything wrong. I
am not so sure. The regret is justifiable because doing harm is in itself morally significant and
the kind of thing that a moral agent strives to avoid inflicting. It is appropriate to reproach
oneself for killing a child, even faultlessly. See Jeffrey Helmreich, Regret, Remorse and Acci-
dents (June 5-6, 2011) (paper presented to the Ctr. for Law History & Culture Junior Scholars
Conference at the Univ. of So. Cal. Gould Sch. of Law).
113. See, e.g., Francis H. Boblen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (pt. 2), 59 U. PA. L. REV.
423, 440 (1911).
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contains a substantial measure of truth.114 This truth, however, should
not cause us to forget one of Bohlen's primary points; namely, that
this recasting of Rylands was a strategy for confining its highly general
principle of strict liability. It is this revisionary American practice that
Fletcher's (and Landes and Posner's) interpretation of natural use as
ordinary, customary, normal use captures, not Lord Cairns's own us-
age. Cairns himself articulated a principle that made strict liability
predominant.
That Rylands endorsed a genuinely strict form of liability was not
lost, moreover, in Losee v. Buchanan, the greatest of the American
cases to reject Rylands's holding and strict liability more generally.115
The heights to which Losee v. Buchanan's justificatory argument soars
help us to recognize that the power of Rylands's position was not lost
even on those courts that rejected its ruling. Losee v. Buchanan
adopted fault liability for an "escaping thing"-parts of a steam boiler
that exploded and were cast onto the plaintiff's property, where they
damaged buildings and personal property.'16 Doctrinally, the opinion
proceeds by distinguishing the adverse precedents in both trespass and
nuisance.117 The court distinguishes the closest trespass precedent
(one involving blasting) on the ground that the injury to the plaintiff's
land was direct and immediate, an end of the action so to speak.118
The nuisance cases are distinguished on the ground that the type of
injury involved in nuisance (a continuous invasion) differs from the
kind of accidental harm involved here (a sudden intrusion). 119 All of
this is consistent with Rylands's own analysis of pertinent doctrine, but
this analysis does not itself supply a governing tort norm.
Perhaps sensing that these arguments are not sufficient responses to
Rylands, the opinion explodes into justificatory argument of the
grandest sort before coming back to doctrine and arguing that the rule
114. On the case for revision, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict
Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110
YALE L.J. 333 (2000). Shugerman argues that, contrary to the prevailing consensus in the Amer-
ican legal academy, "a significant majority of the states actually accepted Rylands in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, at the height of the 'era of fault."' Id. at 334.
115. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 486-87 (1873) ("[T]he law, as laid down in [Rylands and
another case], is in direct conflict with the law as settled in this country. Here, if one builds a
dam upon his own premises and thus holds back and accumulates the water for his benefit, or if
he brings water upon his premises into a reservoir, in case the dam or the banks of the reservoir
give away and the lands of a neighbor are thus flooded, he is not liable for the damage without
proof of some fault or negligence on his part.").
116. Id. at 476.
117. Id. at 479-85.
118. Id. at 479-80.
119. Id. at 482.
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in Rylands is out of step with American cases on liability for fire and
with one on flying rocks.120 On the heels of its grand justificatory ar-
gument, the Losee v. Buchanan opinion interprets "use your property
so as not to injure another" as a maxim of fault liability, enjoining
nothing more than careful use.121 The opinion then ends by insisting
on the universal applicability of the fault principle in this country.122
As Rabin rightly observed in The Fault Principle, this is misleading.
When Losee v. Buchanan is paired with its companion case, Losee v.
Clute,123 the larger liability regime that it instantiates is one where "no
duty"-not fault 'liability-governs most cases of accidental injury.124
Fault reigns supreme only in the domain of accidents among strangers.
In Losee v. Buchanan itself, there is no liability: the manufacturer of
the steam boiler owed no duty to the plaintiff, and the neighbor did
not breach any duty that it owed.125
The point that I want to press is entirely consistent with Rabin's
correct claim that no liability, not even fault liability, dominates the
private law landscape of the late nineteenth century. My point is that
Losee v. Buchanan, like Rylands, has and deserves canonical status
because it addresses the fundamental conflict between negligence and
strict liability with the kind of lucidity and clarity that may only be
possible in moments when the common law is being fundamentally
reconfigured. Losee v. Buchanan's interlude of justificatory argument
is remarkable both in its frankness, its reach, and its invocation of a
Lockean social-contract-style justification:
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to
give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a com-
pensation from the surrender by every other man of the same rights,
and the security, advantage and protection which the laws give me.
So, too, the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undis-
turbed use and possession of my real estate, and that I must so use
my real estate as not to injure my neighbor, are much modified by
the exigencies of the social state. We must have factories, machin-
ery, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded by the mani-
fold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If
I have any of these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and
are not so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any
damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He re-
120. Id. at 486-88.
121. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. at 488.
122. Id. at 491 ("[T]he rule is, at least in this country, a universal one, which, so far as I can
discern, has no exceptions or limitations, that no one can be made liable for injuries to the
person or property of another without some fault or negligence on his part.").
123. See Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
124. Rabin, The Fault Principle, supra note 1, at 946.
125. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. at 491-93.
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ceives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in
which he shares, and the right which he has to place the same things
upon his lands. I may not place or keep a nuisance upon my land to
the damage of my neighbor, and I have my compensation for the
surrender of this right to use my own as I will by the similar restric-
tion imposed upon my neighbor for my benefit. I hold my property
subject to the risk that it may be unavoidably or accidentally injured
by those who live near me; and as I move about upon the public
highways and in all places where other persons may lawfully be, I
take the risk of being accidentally injured in my person by them
without fault on their part. Most of the rights of property, as well as
of person, in the social state, are not absolute but relative, and they
must be so arranged and modified, not unnecessarily infringing
upon natural rights, as upon the whole to promote the general
welfare.126
The court's first argument, then, is that a fault regime promotes the
greater good of industrial progress; its second is that a fault regime
makes each of us better off in two ways. First, as recompense for hav-
ing to bear the nonnegligent accident costs of others' activities, we
have the right to impose the nonnegligent costs of our activities on
others ("the right . . . to place the same things upon his lands").127
Second, fault liability fosters industrial progress; industrial progress
promotes the general good, and we each share in that general good.
Measured, apparently, against some pre-industrial historical baseline,
industrial progress steadily improves each person's welfare. Fault lia-
bility is to everyone's long-run advantage.
Losee v. Buchanan thus invokes the language of reciprocity and mu-
tual benefit against Rylands, claiming that as industry and technology
advance over time, injurers and victims both benefit. Each person's
share in the increasing wealth of an industrializing society helps to
compensate her for increased risks of accidental injury and death inci-
dent to the introduction of industrial machinery. Rylands, however,
gets the better of this argument. Fault liability is not really to the
advantage of the luckless Losee, and Rylands shows how fault liability
treats him unfairly. On the one hand, Losee cannot recover for the
serious harm done to his property by Buchanan's exploding steam
boiler because Buchanan was not culpably responsible for the explo-
sion. On the other hand, Losee cannot recover from the manufacturer
of the boiler because he and the manufacturer are not in privity of
contract. 128 Losee is, to use Justice Blackburn's phrase, therefore
"damnified without any fault of his own," and the harm that he suf-
126. Id. at 484-85.
127. Id. at 485.
128. Clute, 51 N.Y. at 494-95.
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fered at the hands of Buchanan's milling is both greater than, and dis-
proportionate to, the benefit he gained. His share of the increased
prosperity, which is the general benefit of Buchanan's milling, is
roughly the same as the share that every other member of society re-
ceives. Milling increases overall prosperity. Unlike other members of
society, however, he suffers a great loss at the hands of Buchanan's
enterprise. 129
Compared to strict liability, fault liability is neithtr fair to Losee nor
to his advantage. Strict liability would improve Losee's lot because it
would compensate him for the harm he has suffered and that harm
exceeds his small share of the overall social gain. Strict liability is thus
more to Losee's advantage than fault liability. Strict liability is also
fairer than fault liability-it aligns burden with benefit, whereas fault
liability severs the two. Shifting the cost of the accident back onto
Buchanan, who is the principal beneficiary of his own mill, binds the
bitter to the sweet. This, in a nutshell, is the rejoinder of Rylands to
Losee v. Buchanan. It appeals not to a distant historical baseline lost
in the mists of time, but to the relative burdens and benefits of strict
liability and fault in comparison with one another. For Rylands, the
possibilities of the present are decisive.
One of the charms of the debate between Rylands and Losee v.
Buchanan is that it invites extension and elaboration, both in its own
129. Francis Bohlen comments on the unfairness of negligence liability in this context:
[I]t seems fair that one, who personally profits by the privilege to use his land in a
particular way, may not complain of the result of the exercise of another's similar right;
while if the defendant's use be merely for the benefit of the public generally, in which
the adjacent owner shares merely as one of the public, it seems that the latter should
bear no greater part of the damage done by that use than any other member of the
public, who, as such, share equally the benefits derived from permitting it. To throw
the whole of the loss upon one member of the public, simply because it is his misfor-
tune that his property should be situated near to the place which the defendant selects
to carry on the business, tending to increase the general prosperity, is, it seems to the
writer, to throw upon him a loss altogether out of proportion to his share in the benefit
derived from the encouragement of the industry.
If the public be interested, let the public as such bear the loss, but if the neighbors
have such profit by the business by reason of the fact that the right to carry on such
business adds value to their land . . . then, they being particularly benefited, may be
properly singled out to bear the loss.
Bohlen, supra note 113, at 444-46 (footnote omitted). Bohlen goes on to assert that not requir-
ing the enterprise to internalize the cost of the harm caused is presumptively inefficient as well
as unfair. In a lengthy footnote, he comments, "Every burden which an individual is forced to
bear for the benefit of the State is, in the last analysis, a species of taxation." Id. at 444 n.136.
Negligence liability is, in this context, an unfair form of taxation because the benefit of the
defendant's enterprise is captured first by the defendant, next by the general public, and finally
by the victim only insofar as he is a member of the general public. Yet the victim is singled out
to bear the burden of the defendant's enterprise. The victim is therefore taxed in the name of
the general good.
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terms and in terms of competing social-contract frameworks. In its
own terms, the debate frames sharply the question of in-kind compen-
sation for bearing risk and brings to the fore the hard question of just
what the acceptable level of risk is. For Losee, the in-kind compensa-
tion of having the right to purchase defective industrial machinery,
which might unavoidably bomb his neighbors without subjecting
Losee himself to liability, is almost surely of no value. There is no
reason to think that he was putting his land to a use which made
purchasing a steam boiler, or anything else comparably dangerous, at-
tractive. Nor is it obvious that society as a whole is made better off by
acting on Losee v. Buchanan's apparent invitation to ramp up the per-
missible level of nonnegligent risk imposition.130 Whether we should
ratchet up the permissible level of nonnegligent risk imposition de-
pends on whether increasing the overall level of risk in society is a
game worth the candle, particularly when this standard may justify a
kind of risk race. When harm and benefit are asymmetrical, however,
the burden of persuasion lies, in the first instance, with Losee v.
Buchanan. But Losee v. Buchanan is already burdened by its inability
to explain how general benefits shared by all respond to plaintiff's
claim that it is unfairly singled out to bear a devastating loss. Rylands
has the better of the argument.
The debate between Rylands and Losee v. Buchanan, moreover,
goes deeper than intuitive ideas of fairness. Both Losee v. Buchanan
and Rylands implicitly deploy social-contract forms of justification.
They are concerned primarily with interpersonal fairness and with the
hypothetical bargain that potential victims and injurers might reach
regarding the terms on which risks of physical harm are imposed. In
social-contract terms, Losee v. Buchanan, with its appeal to a fixed
historical baseline, is implicitly Lockean whereas Rylands, with its em-
phasis on how injurer and victim fare under alternative liability rules,
is implicitly Kantian.131 One of Rylands's enduring achievements, in-
130. Losee v. Buchanan invites those who suffer at the hands of nonnegligent risk to help
themselves to compensation by imposing nonnegligent risks. Surely, we would not wish to ap-
proach the nonnegligent risks of nuclear power this way.
131. In Locke's formulation of the social contract, people start with various accumulated re-
sources in hand-preeminently, property acquired in the state of nature. The agreement to exit
the state of nature and enter civil society, where one will be subject to political authority, must
be an improvement when measured against this baseline. Analogously, Losee v. Buchanan's
assertion that people are compensated by sharing in the increased wealth created by industriali-
zation for accidental injuries inflicted by the technologies of an industrial civilization appeals
implicitly to a pre-industrial baseline. Rousseau breaks with Locke by making property institu-
tions themselves part of the social contract to which parties agree; Kant follows Rousseau in this
respect. On this view, the relevant baseline is determined present possibilities. Rylands takes
this kind of view by implicitly comparing the distribution of burden and benefit under alternative
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deed, is to have embedded social-contract ideas into tort discourse.132
The considerations of fairness and equal rights that dominate its opin-
ions introduce ideas that differ both from utilitarian and economic
frameworks with their emphases on overall welfare and from correc-
tive justice and civil recourse frameworks with their emphasis on
wrongful conduct. Fletcher's conduct was not wrongful, but it was
only fair that he answer for it. Only then are benefit and burden fairly
aligned between injurer and victim. Strict liability in Rylands is not
and does not claim to be liability for wrongful conduct in the sense
that corrective justice and civil recourse theorists have in mind. What
it is and claims to be is a fair way of reconciling the rights of potential
injurers and victims with respect to nonnegligent risks of accidental
physical harm.
F. Is Rylands Nostalgic?
To recover Rylands for tort theory-its fate in tort practice is a sep-
arate matter-we must rebut interpretations that deflate the case and
deny that it articulates an attractive alternative to negligence liability.
We have already considered one such interpretation, which absorbs
Rylands into negligence by recasting "natural" as customary, usual, or
normal and recasting "non-natural" as unusual or abnormal. We
ought to consider another deflationary interpretation as well. This in-
terpretation characterizes Rylands's embrace of strict liability as a de-
fense of an agrarian past against an industrial present. To a degree,
Justice Blackburn's opinion lends itself to interpretation along these
lines. His argument that strict liability is well suited to the sphere of
real property can certainly be read as an endorsement of quiet repose
and time-honored use. Phrases such as "strict liability in defense of
the sanctity of land" and "strict liability in defense of preexisting use"
do spring to mind when reading Justice Blackburn's opinion.133 On
liability regimes; namely, strict liability and negligence. For a discussion on Locke and Rous-
seau, see Joshua Cohen, Structure, Choice, and Legitimacy: Locke's Theory of the State, 15 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 301, 321-24 (1986). For my extended view on Losee v. Buchanan and Rylands, see
Keating, supra note 17, at 313-25 (discussing Losee v. Buchanan and Rylands at greater length).
132. See, e.g, Fletcher, supra note 85, at 543. Bohlen's The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is not
strictly a social-contract interpretation of Rylands, but it may do more than any other commen-
tary on the case to bring out the idea of interpersonal fairness at the heart of Rylands's case for
strict liability. See Bohlen, supra note 113, at 444-46.
133. Rabin's discussion of Rylands in The Fault Principle may intimate this interpretation of
the case. However, the interpretation is identified primarily with Francis Bohlen's great article
on the case, however. See Bohlen, supra note 65, at 318-25. Bohlen's view appears to have been
complex. On the one hand, he saw substantial evidence for the view of Rylands as strict liability
in defense of hallowed uses of land. On the other hand, Bohlen, more than any other American
commentator, saw in Rylands the essentials of a distinctively modern, fairness-based case for
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this interpretation, Rylands is the record of a clash between an emerg-
ing industrial activity (coal mining) and an established agrarian soci-
ety. Viewed through this prism, the opinions' preference for strict
liability appears to favor the status quo and to disfavor dynamic eco-
nomic change and industrial progress. Rylands and strict liability are
on the wrong side of progress.
It is, to be sure, true that Cairns's embrace of the concept of "natu-
ral" uses exempts some long-standing uses of land from strict liability
and subjects most new uses-ones that are not uniquely suited to their
sites-to such liability. It is also true that Justice Blackburn's opinion
looks back to ancient forms of strict liability embodied by the real
property torts of trespass and nuisance. But we should not make too
much of this latter point. Legal decision is decision in accordance with
preexisting norms. It must look backwards for authority. Seminal
fault cases look backwards as well, reconfiguring fault from a mental
state necessary to the commission of certain nominate torts and into a
basic principle of conduct governing risky acts and activities. 134 More
importantly, nothing in Rylands's facts lends much support either to
the claim that reservoirs were unusual or to the claim that Rylands's
imposition of strict liability is guarding an agrarian past against indus-
trial change. On the contrary, Rylands involved a contest between the
two great enterprises of northern England-cotton mills and coal
mines-in the first full flowering of the industrial revolution. Rylands
occurred in the Silicon Valley of its age, and its age was the dawn of
the industrial revolution.
Both coal mining and cotton milling were on the cutting edge of this
industrial revolution, they coexisted in close proximity to each other,
and they clashed over water. Water was "a resource for cotton mill-
ing, a liability for mining," and a standing source of friction between
the two enterprises. 135 This is a classic case of accidental harm in an
industrializing world: two beneficial, productive activities interact in a
way that occasionally causes unintended injury. Strict liability is
adopted as a liability rule appropriate to accidents between neighbor-
ing industries. The site of the dispute was just outside Manchester "in
Lancashire, on the road between Bolton and Bury, in the two small
activity liability. See Bohlen, supra note 113, at 444-46. American case law rhetoric, including
the rhetoric in Losee v. Buchanan, often reads Rylands in this way.
134. See WHITE, supra note 31, at 12-13.
135. Clare Dalton, Losing History: Tort Liability in the Nineteenth Century and the Case of
Rylands v. Fletcher 10 (1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Abraham,
supra note 33, at 208-10 (discussing the facts of the case and the broader backgrounds of the
parties in Rylands).
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towns of Ainsworth and Radcliffe." 136 John Rylands "was a second
generation cotton master." 137 The mill had been part of his family's
cotton business since 1839. "It was steam powered, supplied with coal
from a small nearby colliery, and with water from two reservoirs." 3 s
An 1865 report suggested that it was large, running roughly 600 looms
and employing roughly 600 operators.139 To improve the efficiency of
the mill, the expansion of the reservoir was undertaken "on land
rented from Lord Wilton" in 1860.140
Fletcher had also leased his land from the Earl of Wilton, "the most
prominent local landowner."141 The mine that he worked, which was
adjacent to Rylands's property, was an existing one; "his operations
were an extension of other earlier efforts."1 42 When the reservoir
burst and flooded his mine in December of 1860, Fletcher "did not see
the damage as irreparable. Even before this inundation, the pumps in
the colliery had worked sixteen hours a day in summer and twenty
hours in winter to keep the mine clear; now pumping was increased
and by March of the following year the water was exhausted."143 In-
deed, water was so pervasive in the mine that the mill later acquired
the mine for use as a water source.144 Before Fletcher could reopen
the mine, however, the boiler that drove his pump burst.145 Shortly
thereafter, he was paid a visit by an inspector of mines and advised
"not to work the colliery while the reservoir was in use for storing
water."146 Fletcher then retained solicitors and sued Rylands. 147
There is no reason to think this mixture of mines and reservoirs as
unusual. None of the opinions suggests that Rylands's construction of
a reservoir was out of the ordinary. Reservoirs were commonly used
to power cotton mills, and cotton mills had risen all over northern
England by the middle of the nineteenth century. 148 Coal mines were
136. Dalton, supra note 135, at 10.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 11 n.9.
140. Id. at 10-12. Kenneth Abraham reports that John Rylands was "[t]he 'Wellington of
Commerce"' and that he was the "sole owner of ... the largest employer in England, having
12,000 employees in seventeen separate mills." Abraham, supra note 33, at 209 (citing Simpson,
supra note 41, at 239 n.117).
141. Dalton, supra note 135, at 11.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 13 n.17.
145. Id. at 13-14.
146. Id. at 14.
147. Dalton, supra note 135, at 14.
148. "[T]he first three decades of the 19th century [saw] a great expansion in country mills
.... " E. P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 336 (1963).
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equally pervasive and equally a manifestation of the industrial revolu-
tion in its first full flowering. On the facts of this case, the entangle-
ment of the two uses could not have been closer-coal powered
Rylands's mill, and water being harnessed for use by Rylands's mill
flooded Fletcher's mine.1 4 9 Finally, Lord Wilton, who had leased land
to both Rylands and Fletcher, was not a feudal lord bent on preserv-
ing an agrarian status quo; he was a man who had put his property to
use on the cutting edge of the industrial revolution.
The facts of Rylands, then, do not bear out a story of an agrarian
past embattled in an industrializing present. Nor do they support a
concomitant view of strict liability as a bulwark of the old world
against the emerging industrial order. What they reveal is a story of
two modern industries colliding with one another. This is the standard
story of the industrial age and the true social setting that led to the
reconfiguration of tort itself around accidental harm. Rylands stakes
the claim for reconfiguring the emerging, modern law of torts around
strict liability, not fault. That did not happen. The reasons why it did
not happen, however, cannot have anything to do with Rylands's case
for strict liability being a nostalgic effort to protect an agrarian past
against an emerging industrial future. Rylands's general principle of
strict liability was forged in the crucible of the industrial revolution in
its first bloom in order to fairly govern the pervasive friction between
the two principal industries of the age. Modern strict liability is born
as an answer to the canonical modern problem of tort law; namely,
how to address the recurring harms that are the inescapable by-
product of industrial activity.150 It is incipiently modern.
IV. RYLANDs's FATE
As a matter of legal doctrine, Rylands's legacy is a study in twists
and turns. Initially, it seems to have been resisted in the United
States. Subsequently, it seems to have been widely accepted.15' In
the middle of the twentieth century, the line of doctrine that Rylands
149. Abraham, supra note 33, at 209-10.
150.
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults,
slanders, and the like ... . But the torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are
mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or
property by railroads, factories, and the like.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 183 (1920)
(originally published in 1897).
151. The history here defies easy summary, but Kenneth Abraham does a good job in few
pages. See Abraham, supra note 33, at 220-24; see also Shugerman, supra note 114 (the preemi-
nent contemporary study of Rylands's reception in America).
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spawned had coalesced under the name of "abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity" law, and that body of doctrine held out the promise of blossom-
ing into a broad form of activity-based liability. With the waning of
enterprise liability over the past generation, however, abnormally
dangerous activity liability has turned out to be a relatively small do-
main of strict liability.152 In England, after early widespread accept-
ance, Rylands appears to have been absorbed into nuisance
liability. 153 Measured in terms of present-day doctrine directly de-
scended from the case, the contemporary impact of Rylands is re-
markably modest. Strict liability has not exploded and conquered the
law of torts; it is sovereign only in its native habitat of the property
torts. Elsewhere, it is the road not taken and which might yet be
taken.
Some of the misinterpretations examined in this Article have no
doubt played a role in limiting Rylands's doctrinal reach. Reinter-
preting "natural" as "normal" and "non-natural" as "abnormal" radi-
cally restricts the scope of Rylands's strict liability. Indeed, as
Professor Kenneth Abraham shrewdly suggests, the very name "ab-
normally dangerous activity liability" has probably contributed to lim-
iting Rylands-based strict liability:
The dangerousness requirement that is so central to strict liability
doctrine depends for its content on both ordinary attitudes toward
risky activities and on the technological state of the art. Given the
direction in which both these phenomena have evolved over time, it
is no surprise that there has been no growth in the number of activi-
ties considered abnormally dangerous. On the whole, life has been
getting safer, both in the eyes of the public and in fact.154
But it would be a mistake to attribute too much of Rylands's fate to
the intellectual particulars of its misinterpretation by American tort
scholars. Academic commentary does not determine the history of
152. One careful, if dated, compilation of activities contained in the law of abnormally dan-
gerous activities is contained in William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1705, 1715-16 (1992). Because abnormally dangerous activity doctrine takes
the form of a standard and not a rule, its application is both contextual and open-ended. Conse-
quently, the doctrine has the capacity to cover an indefinite number of activities. That capacity
is missed by a nose-counting of cases. If enterprise liability were suddenly to sweep our law of
torts (an unlikely development to be sure), the formal doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity
liability would prove receptive to much more expansive application than it now receives. For an
example of such application, see Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765, 765-66 (Iowa 1964) (hold-
ing a waterworks strictly liable for damage done by the breakage of a water main and citing
Rylands). A waterworks does not make abnormally dangerous use of water.
153. See supra note 151 for a discussion of Rylands's early acceptance by early courts. For
Rylands's contemporary absorption into nuisance law in England, see Cambridge Water Co. v.
E. Cntys. Leather PLC, [1994] All E.R. (H.L.) 53.
154. Abraham, supra note 33, at 224.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tort law. At most, it embeds certain conceptions in the consciousness
of lawyers and judges. That is surely important, but it is only one
factor affecting the scope of Rylands's application. Rylands's fate is
bound up with the larger fate of strict and enterprise liability in Amer-
ican tort law and with 150 years of tort history. The story of Rylands's
fate is in fact a number of distinct stories, each of them complex.
A. Strict Liability in Tort
One story about the fate of strict liability is a story about the subter-
ranean presence of strict liability within negligence law. Doctrines
such as the "reasonable person" standard, res ipsa loquitur, vicarious
liability, doctrines of proximate cause that extend liability beyond the
harm foreseeably risked, and various procedural devices and burdens
of proof introduce a great deal of strict liability into negligence.155
The presence of these strict liabilities in negligence law may represent
negligence law's covert subsummation of strict liability. Thus, they
may be, as Abraham argues in his contribution to this Symposium, a
subterranean triumph of strict liability and, by extension, a partial vin-
dication of Rylands.156 A slightly different story shows how enterprise
liability-a form of liability which flowers most fully in its strict incar-
nation 157-has exerted a powerful influence within modern negligence
law. Rabin's Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability is
the path-breaking piece in this regard.158
A second story has to do with the presence of strict liability in tort
more generally. Intentional torts, such as trespass, conversion, nui-
155. Professor Kenneth Abraham's illuminating contribution to this Symposium investigates
this topic. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV.
271 (2012). For a different angle on this topic, see Keating, supra note 34, at 1292-303. Rabin
emphasized the role of enterprise liability within negligence law and is, to my knowledge, the
only one to do so. See generally Rabin, Some Thoughts, supra note 2. Francis Bohlen astutely
observed that strict liability is actually carried furthest in some of the exceptions to the general
nonliability of principals for the torts of independent agents. See Bohlen, supra note 113, at 448,
452 ("The principle [of liability without fault] is carried farthest in those cases which hold that
one who lets out work, dangerous unless preventive measures be taken, liable for the indepen-
dent contactor's failure to take the necessary precautions.... The defendant, himself innocent, is
held liable because, by causing, for his own purposes, dangerous work to be done, he is the
author of the harm caused by its performance without the precautions necessary to secure the
safety of others." (footnote omitted)).
156. See Abraham, supra note 155.
157. This is because enterprise liability requires the internalization of the financial costs of
accidental harm by the activities responsible for their infliction. See supra note 34. Strict liabil-
ity realizes this objective more fully than negligence liability because, even perfectly applied,
negligence liability leaves the costs of nonnegligent accidents on their victims.
158. See generally Rabin, Some Thoughts, supra note 2; see also Keating, supra note 34, at
1329-32 (discussing enterprise liability within negligence law).
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sance, and battery (in some of its incarnations), and the doctrine of
conditional private necessity in Vincent v. Lake Erie are all instances
of strict liability.159 Strict liability is therefore alive and well, even in
this present era of resurgent negligence liability-though freestanding
torts embracing strict liability are mostly property torts. That impor-
tant fact is one to which I shall return.
Yet a third story has to do with how to understand nonfault admin-
istrative schemes such as workers' compensation and no-fault automo-
bile insurance. Should these be grouped with strict liabilities in tort?
Or should they be treated as radically distinct doctrines on the ground
that they are administrative schemes, not private law? The question
of whether tort is an autonomous field of law is a large one, but it is
plain that the history of strict liability in tort cannot be understood
without attending to the impact of these administrative schemes-es-
pecially workers' compensation-on tort law proper.160 How we un-
derstand the relation of these schemes to tort law proper, moreover,
has a profound impact on how we understand the shape of the rele-
vant legal landscape and the amount of strict liability that we find in
the field as a whole.
A fourth story concerns the ebb and flow of enterprise and strict
liability within the tort realm of accident law. In broad outline, that
story is one of expansion starting early in the twentieth century, end-
ing in the 1980s, and reversing since the mid-1980s.161 The restricted
159. Some of these doctrines are discussed in Gregory C. Keating, Is the Role of Tort to Re-
pair Wrongful Losses?, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAw 367 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson
eds., 2011).
160. The classic article on the impact of workers' compensation on tort proper remains Jer-
emiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts (pts. 1 & 2), 27 HARv. L. REV. 235,
(1914), 27 HARV. L. REv. 344 (1914). Smith did not believe that the two bodies of law were
wholly independent:
There is a movement now going on in this country for the enactment of legislation
based on the principle of the English Workmen's Compensation Act. This legislation is
founded largely upon a theory inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the mod-
em common law of torts. As to a considerable number of the accidents covered by
some of the recent statutes, the results reached under the statute would be absolutely
irreconcilable with results reached at common law in cases outside the scope of the
statute. This incongruity must inevitably provoke discussion as to the intrinsic correct-
ness of the modern common law of torts; and is likely to lead, either to a movement in
favor of repealing the statutes, or to a movement in favor of making radical changes in
the common law.
Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts (pt. 1), supra, at 235 (footnote omitted). Apoc-
alyptically, Smith prophesied that the common law of torts would become stricter in diverse
ways. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts (pt. 2), supra, at 367. Over the course of
the next sixty years, much of the transformation that Smith foretold came to pass in the common
law of California at a time when California tort law blazed the way for the country as a whole.
See Keating, supra note 34, at 1297-303.
161. See supra note 34.
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law of abnormally dangerous activities that we now witness is partly a
result of a generation of contraction. But even the broad outlines of
this story of expansion and contraction are contestable. It is arguable
that the expansion of tort liability in the middle third of the twentieth
century was mostly attributable to an increasingly stringent and capa-
cious negligence law.162 The persistence of this debate is a testament
to the plasticity of tort law: the interrelations of negligence and strict
liability are sufficiently intense and complex that first-rate scholars
working in good faith can offer very different accounts of the law and
its evolution. Last, this large story subsumes many smaller ones, such
as Professor Nora Engstrom's history of no-fault automobile insur-
ance, presented in this Symposium.1 63
B. Strict Liability and Property Rights
In light of these complexities, the influence of Rylands on tort prac-
tice over the past 150 years is a topic we would be wise to leave for
another occasion. The internal logic of the opinions and the doctrine
to which the case gives birth are only one part of Rylands's influence
and may not by themselves do much to account for the vicissitudes of
strict liability in American law. There is, however, one respect in
which a distinctive characteristic of strict liability norms themselves
probably have shaped the evolution of strict liability in American law.
The relation of strict liability to property has been a recurring theme
in discussions of Rylands, and it is a recurring feature of strict liabili-
ties in law. The long-standing, well-settled strict liabilities in our law
protect property rights, as trespass, conversion, and nuisance do. Of
course these are the very strict liabilities from which Rylands extracts
its general principle. The question naturally arises whether strict lia-
bility has an enduring affinity for property.
The normative implication of strict liability's entanglement with
property rights is troubling and not easy to justify. Normatively, it is
not easy to explain why property should receive more protection than
the physical integrity of the person does. Indeed, it seems perverse:
no rational person values their property more than their life. For the
tort system to take the stand that property deserves more protection
than physical integrity seems either perverse (if everyone's property is
protected more than their physical integrity) or morally disturbing (if
162. Gary Schwartz developed this thesis in a number of important articles. See, e.g., Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA.
L. REV. 601 (1992).
163. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault's "Demise," 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012).
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some people's property is protected more than other people's physical
integrity).
Putting this thorny normative worry to the side, however, there is
another reason why the internal logic of strict liability conceptions
makes strict liability particularly well suited to the protection of prop-
erty rights. Strict liability requires the attribution of harms to acts or
activities. That is not always easy to do without a fault criterion and
may sometimes be impossible to do without a fault criterion. One
need not accept the radical Coasean premise that injurers and victims
are equally responsible for all harms to appreciate the force of Bram-
well's observation that "[w]here two carriages come in collision, if
there is no negligence in either it is as much the act of the one driver
as of the other that they meet."M In the automobile accident context,
in fact, the attribution problem is so acute that strict liability in its
usual form-holding injurers liable for all the physical harms that is-
sue from the characteristic risks of their activity-is not a feasible al-
ternative to negligence. Strict liability for automobile accidents can be
instituted only by a non-tort administrative scheme.16 5 It is well nigh
impossible for common law adjudication to identify who is responsible
for injuring whom in an automobile accident without deploying a fault
criterion, but it is comparatively easy to identify an injury suffered in
the course of an automobile accident and thus comparatively easy to
implement no-fault automobile insurance.
On the one hand, this explains the affinity of common law strict
liability for property conceptions and property rights. Property norms
enable drawing boundaries between activities without recourse to any
criterion of fault. On the other hand, the vulnerability of common law
strict liability to attribution problems explains the allure of adminis-
trative schemes for strict liability in general and the resilience of negli-
gence liability as the common law's default norm. 16 6  No-fault
automobile insurance shows how non-tort administrative schemes are
often able to solve attribution problems that common law incarnations
of enterprise liability cannot solve.167 By requiring victims to insure
against nonnegligent losses (as well as negligent ones), no-fault insur-
ance is capable of attributing the nonnegligent accident costs of driv-
ing to the activity of driving along with the costs of negligent
164. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. Div.) 744 (Bramwell J. dissenting).
165. Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 (Ct. App. 1971), is instructive in this
regard.
166. Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1861-62, 1899-903 (2004).
167. Id. at 1901.
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accidents.168 Compulsory loss insurance attributes the costs of auto-
mobile accidents to the activity of driving without requiring us to sort
injurers from victims in cases of nonnegligent injury.169 This way of
surmounting the attribution problem is not available to the common
law.
Other administrative schemes solve attribution problems which
would bedevil, if not defeat, the common law of torts by specifying in
detail which injuries are to be attributed to a particular activity. The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, for example, incorporates a
Vaccine Injury Table, listing illnesses associated with various vaccines
and time periods following the administration of a vaccination within
which the first symptom or manifestation of an illness must occur.170
Proof that an illness occurred within a specific time period creates a
rebuttable presumption that the vaccination was its cause.171 The ag-
gregate statistical connections between exposure and illness establish
causation.172
The second advantage of administrative schemes over the common
law is that they can often affect enterprise liability more effectively
than the common law because they can exert more control over the
mechanisms and institutions of insurance. Enterprise liability in tort
must, for the most part, hope that the imposition of strict liability will
stimulate the provision of appropriate self or third-party insurance
against liability. Administrative schemes, by contrast, can compel the
purchase of insurance.173 Compelling insurance against some class of
accidents both stimulates the demand for insurance and facilitates its
provision-other things equal, the larger the pool of insureds the eas-
ier it is to spread risk among them.174 Administrative schemes can
also compel the use of particular insurance mechanisms, as no-fault
automobile liability schemes compel the use of first-party insurance
against loss. Indeed, administrative schemes can foster the provision
of insurance even more directly. Legislatures and administrative
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (2006).
171. Id. § 300aa-13.
172. Id. § 300aa-14.
173. For example, compelled insurance is a universal feature of workers' compensation
schemes. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, 9 LARSON's WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 150.01 (2011) ("All states require that compensation liability be secured.").
174. See ROBERT 1. MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE (8th ed. 1985) (listing "a large
group of homogeneous exposure units" as the first of seven criteria that "need to be considered
before attempting to operate a successful insurance plan"). Note that a larger but less homoge-
nous pool of insureds is not necessarily easier to insure. It depends on whether size dominates
homogeneity in the context at hand.
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agencies can construct appropriate insurance mechanisms and require
the provision of insurance to parties who are unable either to self-
insure or to purchase private insurance in the marketplace. State-
sponsored insurance funds are a familiar part of workers' compensa-
tion law, for example, as is the practice of providing for assignment of
rejected risks.' 75
A fundamental conceptual requirement of strict liability-that acci-
dents be attributable to activities without recourse to a fault crite-
rion-may thus help to explain (1) the affinity of common law strict
liability for property rights; (2) the tendency to institute strict liability
through non-tort administrative schemes; and (3) the correlative resili-
ence of negligence liability as the default regime of the common law
of torts.17 6 The conceptual demands of strict liability may prevent it
from becoming the dominant common law liability norm, quite apart
from other considerations.
Doctrinally, the fate of Rylands is curious in the following way. Ry-
lands sought to generalize an abstract principle of strict liability from
the particular strict liabilities of the property torts. Intellectually, the
opinions succeeded: the principle that people should bear the costs of
the harms that they inflict on others in the course of pursuing their
own private ends is as general and as intuitively appealing as the fault
principle with which it competes. Practically, Rylands has been a dis-
appointment: strict liability has not expanded very far beyond its se-
cure home in the property torts. One reason why (there are no doubt
others as well) is that it is far easier to attribute harms to activities
when richly articulated property rights are in play than it is in the
sphere of life where activities tend to collide like cars on a highway.
In this latter sphere, negligence law's criterion of fault has proven far
easier for common law courts to wield.
V. LESSONS FOR TORT THEORY
The fundamental lessons that Rylands itself can teach, however, are
lessons for tort theory. The fundamental responsibility of tort schol-
ars is to get tort law right. Tort scholars are not responsible for shap-
ing the history or the politics of the subject, but they are specially
responsible for getting tort law right. Paramount here is the responsi-
175. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 173, § 150.01[1] ("Six states require insurance in an
exclusive state fund. Fourteen states have competitive state funds." (footnote omitted)); see also
id. § 150.05[3] ("Assigned Risk Practice"). In a similar vein, the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986, codified principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34, creates a trust fund to
pay compensation to those eligible to recover under the Act.
176. Keating, supra note 166, at 1860, 1912, 1917.
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bility to get tort's fundamental ideas right. In this respect, tort schol-
ars have not acquitted themselves as well as they might have. Rylands
in fact makes its ideas remarkably clear. It earns its standing as a
great common law case by ascending from the gnarly details of ancient
doctrines to the general moral conceptions which give them sense and
justification. The case that the opinions in Rylands make for strict
liability is in fact clear, coherent, and intuitively powerful. To be sure,
the opinions hardly settle the case for strict liability (what case could
meet that burden?) but they do as much as any single set of opinions
can to make the character of, and prima facie case for, strict liability
clear and vivid. Tort scholars have not always done as well in their
efforts to transmit Rylands's lessons across time. For whatever rea-
son, the exemplary achievements of those such as Newark and Boh-
len, who have gotten the case right, have competed with far less-
sound interpretations, and those interpretations have sown confusion.
This is unfortunate because the lessons of Rylands should be perma-
nently available to tort scholarship.
At present, the understanding of Rylands by the tort theorists who
would seem to be its natural audience is impeded by a particular bur-
den; namely, the burden of the idea that tort law is a realm of "con-
duct-based wrongs."' 77 Sometimes, this leads to conceptualizing strict
liability of the sort found in Rylands as a kind of ramped up negli-
gence liability that flatly imposes a duty not to harm:
Strict and fault liability are different ways of articulating the content
of one's duty to others.
In torts, blasting is governed by strict liability and motoring by
fault liability. The way to understand the difference is as follows.
In the case of motoring, my duty of care is a duty to exercise reason-
able care; it is a duty-not-to-harm-you through carelessness, reck-
lessness, or intention. The law demands that I take reasonable
precautions not to harm you . . . . In the case of blasting, however,
the law imposes on me the duty-not-to-harm-you. The way I am to
take your interests into account is to make sure that I don't harm
you by blasting.
The difference between fault and strict liability is a difference in
the content of the duty of care I owe to you.... If my duty to you is
a duty-not-to-harm-you, then the only way that I can discharge that
duty is by not harming you.
177. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
917-18, 935-36 (2010); Christopher Kutz, Pragmatism Regained, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1641
(2002) (book review).
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If my duty to you is a duty-not-to-harm-you-faultily . . . , then I
can discharge that duty either by not harming you or by not being at
fault-whether or not I harm you. 178
When strict liability is conceived as a duty not to harm, it becomes a
conduct-based wrong and so conforms to the demands of corrective
justice theory as Professor Jules Coleman conceives them. Unfortu-
nately, the duty in Rylands is not a duty to do no harm. The defen-
dant's conduct in imposing the risk responsible for the damage was
wholly unobjectionable, as the court says. The defendant's wrong lies
in failing to repair harm reasonably inflicted. Strict liability in Ry-
lands simply does not fit the mold of a conduct-based wrong.
Other tort theorists, equally attached to the idea of tort as a law of
conduct-based wrongs, conceptualize Rylands as not really tort at all.
The law of torts is a law of wrongs, and Rylands is an example of
courts imposing liability on harms caused "through conduct that the
courts themselves are at pains to say is entirely permissible."1 79 This
conception misses the mark too. The harm in Rylands is not a matter
of moral indifference just because the conduct responsible for in-
flicting the harm was free of fault. The infliction of harm is morally
significant in itself and the message of Rylands is that it is wrong for
the defendant to have failed to repair the harm that it inflicted on the
plaintiff. It is wrong because it is unfair. Plaintiff and defendant have
equal claims-equal rights to use their property as they see fit. Their
rights must therefore be reconciled fairly; that is, on terms that reflect
their equality. It is wrong and unfair to sacrifice the plaintiff's rights
simply because the defendant's pursuit of its own interest was rational
and careful. Rylands is, then, an example of a particular kind of
wrong, one which is distinctive in part because it is not conduct based.
Rylands is thus presently important in part because it illustrates a
kind of wrong that does not match the template promoted by many
contemporary tort theorists. For these tort theorists, torts are wrongs,
and wrongs are conduct based in the sense that the primary conduct
responsible for the infliction of injury is wrong (as is the case in negli-
gence liability). This template is too narrow. Wrongs are violations of
rights and not all violations of rights are conduct based. In some
cases, the wrong lies not in inflicting injury in the first instance but in
178. Jules L. Coleman, Facts, Fictions, and the Grounds of Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
327, 329 (Joseph Keim Campbell et al. eds., 2005); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE
OF PRINCIPLE 35 n.19 (2001) ("The concept of a duty in tort law is central both to strict and fault
liability. In strict liability, the generic form of the first-order duty is a 'duty not to harm some-
one', while in fault, the generic form of a duty is a 'duty not to harm someone negligently or
carelessly'.").
179. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 177, at 951.
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failing to step forward and make reparation for harm reasonably in-
flicted. Rylands is one of those cases. Its moral message is that moral
responsibility does not come to an end because harm is unavoidable.
Even unavoidable harm can trigger moral responsibility; even una-
voidable harm can trigger a duty of repair. That moral message is,
indeed, Rylands's most provocative lesson.
At a deeper level, fault theorists who assert that the limit of respon-
sibility is reached when unintended harm is inflicted by unreasonable
conduct and that harm inflicted by reasonable conduct is no different
from suffering misfortune at the hands of Mother Nature are evading
a challenge that they should confront. 80 Rylands stands for the thesis
that harm issuing from human agency is always significant and always
subject to legal and moral assessment. Even harm reasonably done
may require reparation for reasons that the facts and the opinions
make clear. Natural misfortune is categorically different. It is anthro-
pomorphic nonsense to speak seriously of holding natural forces re-
sponsible for the mischief that they do. Agency is an inescapable
condition of responsibility for harm done. Faulty agency, however,
may not be a necessary condition of such responsibility. That, indeed,
may be the deepest lesson of Rylands.
VI. RYLANDS AND RABIN
We have traveled a long way from Rabin's illuminating history of
the emergence of fault liability. It is time to find our way back. The
argument of this Article has been that Rylands really does articulate
strict liability as a general idea at a formative moment in the history of
the common law and that it should be so understood in the tort canon.
If this argument is correct, does it bear on the large and enduring con-
tributions that Rabin has made to our thinking about tort law? There
is reason, I think, to believe that the answer to this question is yes.
Rylands is a principal common law font of enterprise liability. With
the exception of Guido Calabresi, Rabin has been more interested
in-and more sympathetic to-enterprise liability than any other tort
scholar of his generation. I am surely not the only tort scholar of my
generation to have benefited greatly from his work on the subject,
180. See, e.g., Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 82, at 113 ("For the agent who follows the
moral law, his agency-for which consequences of his or her actions he or she is responsible or
owns-pretty much ends with the intended consequences of his or her action. ... Simply substi-
tute fault for the moral law. The person who is at fault opens himself or herself up to liability for
unintended consequences of his conduct, including some that would not have occurred but for
the conduct of others... . Fault, far from rendering causation and agency otiose, actually defines
the scope of their relevance.").
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especially his excavation of enterprise liability themes and concep-
tions within the modern law of negligence.'81
The significance of Rabin's work on enterprise liability, moreover,
extends beyond excavating enterprise liability influences in negligence
law in two ways. First, Rabin has been sensitive to the importance of
institutions for modern tort law. This manifests itself in part in The
Fault Principle's emphasis on negligence as an institution, not just a
single norm commanding due care. But Rabin's awareness of institu-
tions also manifests itself in sensitivity to the way in which the modern
law of torts must grapple with systemic risks imposed by large firms,
government agencies, and enduring, highly structured activities. His
work rightly embraces enterprise liability conceptions in order to ad-
dress these institutional realities. This aspect of his work is evident
not only in his article Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise
Liability, but also in his seminal article Enabling Torts.182
Strict enterprise (or activity) liability is tort law's most robust at-
tempt to come to grips with the fact that we live, to paraphrase
Holmes, in a "world of activities," even though our law of torts comes
from a "world of acts." For all its intellectual power and practical
resilience, negligence liability is not entirely at home in our "world of
activities." Its quest for individual fault feels too much like the pursuit
of the wrong target. "It is well known among insurance profession-
als," for example, "that there are no 'safe' drivers because even 'at
fault' accidents and traffic convictions are mostly random events-the
luck of conditions existing when a mistake is made." 183 Figuring out
how to govern the risks of the activity of driving and make it reasona-
bly safe ought to be, therefore, more important than figuring out when
to classify individual actions within the activity as wrong. Enterprise
liability turns our attention toward institutions more than negligence
liability does and so is better suited to this task. In this respect, enter-
prise liability may actually be more modern than we have yet become.
Rabin's work gently nudges us toward this future.
Second, Rabin's work has been set apart from almost all other work
on enterprise liability by its sensitivity to the moral considerations that
support holding activities responsible for the harms that issue from
their characteristic risks. Most work on enterprise liability-for and
against-is informed by economic ideas. These ideas have proven to
181. See generally Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, supra note 2.
182. See generally Rabin, Enabling Torts, supra note 2.
183. Engstrom, supra note 163, at 330 n.129 (quoting Patrick Butler & Twiss Butler, Driver
Record: A Political Red Herring that Reveals the Basic Flaw in Automobile Insurance Pricing, 8 J.
INS. REG. 200, 201 (1989)).
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be both powerful and fertile. But they have tended to eclipse discus-
sion of the moral reasons and conceptions that bear on enterprise lia-
bility, just as they have tended to eclipse the truth that torts are
wrongs. This is unfortunate. Enterprise liability is concerned with
preventing and repairing serious physical harm. Serious physical
harm, its prevention, and its repair are topics of intrinsic moral signifi-
cance. They can never be matters of moral indifference and are pre-
sumptively matters of moral right and responsibility. Strict enterprise
liability cannot be fully understood and appraised until the moral rea-
sons in its favor are unearthed and assessed. In this respect, Rabin
and Rylands are colleagues and allies. What they have to say is part of
the enduring conversation of tort law on its basic questions. It falls to
us to hear their voices and to dedicate ourselves to moving forward in
dialog with them.
